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ABSTRACT. Courts and legal scholars have long been concerned with the problem of
"entrenchment" -the ways that incumbents insulate themselves and their favored policies from
the normal processes of democratic change. But this wide swath of case law and scholarship has
focused nearly exclusively on formal entrenchment: the legal rules governing elections, the
processes for enacting and repealing legislation, and the methods of constitutional adoption and
amendment. This Article demonstrates that political actors also entrench themselves and their
policies through an array of functional alternatives. By enacting substantive policies that
strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents, by shifting the composition of the
political community, or by altering the structure of political decision making, political actors can
achieve the same entrenching results without resorting to the kinds of formal rule changes that
raise red flags. Recognizing the continuity of formal and functional entrenchment forces us to
consider why public law condemns the former while ignoring or pardoning the latter.
Appreciating the prevalence of functional entrenchment also raises a broader set of questions
about when impediments to political change should be viewed as democratically pathological
and how we should distinguish entrenchment from ordinary democratic politics.
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INTRODUCTION
In politics, winning is only the first step. The challenge is then to make
victories "stay won"-to protect them from reversal when political fortunes
shift. Thus we see parties, politicians, and prevailing coalitions continually
strategizing to lock in their gains, battening down their offices and policies
against the winds of political change.
As far as public law is concerned, such efforts at political "entrenchment"
are viewed as dubious at best. In the context of election law, attempts by
temporarily prevailing political parties, incumbent politicians, and electoral
majorities to solidify their hold on office by gerrymandering electoral districts,
selectively restricting the franchise, or using campaign finance regulation to
suppress the political speech of opponents have been the target of sustained
criticism by scholars and some skeptical attention on the part of courts.'
Manipulating the ground rules of electoral politics in these ways is regarded as
an obvious pathology of democratic politics.' A separate body of scholarly
commentary and judicial decision making condemns "legislative
entrenchment" in the form of explicitly unrepealable statutes and elevated
procedural requirements for statutory revision. Here again, the entrenchment
of political outcomes is viewed as self-evidently illegitimate: it is said to be a
fundamental principle of democracy that "governments are not allowed to bind
future governments"' and that a present majority cannot "bind the hands of
future decision makers."'
Yet political actors intent on entrenching their preferred parties or policies
need not resort to manipulating the formal rules of the Constitution, elections,
or legislation. Consider recent changes to public-sector labor law. Labor unions
generally provide support to Democratic candidates, mobilizing pro-
Democratic voters and funding the logistical and organizational infrastructure
of Democratic campaigns. Seeking to defend their hold on power against
Democratic challengers, Republican officeholders have enacted restrictive labor
1. See infra Section I.B.i.
2. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a
Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 305 (1991)
(citing Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Fairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REv.
227, 239 (1985)).
3. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78
U. CHI. L. REv. 879, 881 (2011).
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legislation for the purpose of weakening unions.5 In 2011, for instance, the
Republican-dominated Wisconsin legislature overhauled the state's collective
bargaining laws to profoundly curtail unions' ability to participate effectively in
politics. In case the purpose of these measures was not apparent, the new
restrictions exempted all the unions that had endorsed the Republican
Governor in the previous election.6 The goal, it seems, was to selectively
incapacitate the Republicans' political opponents,' and not just at the state
level: as Wisconsin's Republican senate majority leader put it at the time,
"[I]f we win this battle, and the money is not there under the auspices of the
unions . . . President Obama is going to have a. . . much more difficult time
getting elected . . . ." Wisconsin Republicans intent on undermining their
political opposition and entrenching their party in office did not need to resort
to disfranchisement or gerrymandered electoral districts. They used labor law
instead.
Or consider Social Security, a program that is notorious for its resistance to
reform or retrenchment. The program is not protected by any legal barrier to
repeal or special election rules favoring its supporters. Rather, the program
mobilized and empowered its defenders to stave off subsequent political
attacks. Put differently, Social Security is entrenched not formally, but
functionally. This was no accident. In developing the program, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt "had one overriding aim. He wanted to entrench
[S]ocial [S]ecurity so deeply in our institutional life that it would be politically
5. See Steven Greenhouse, G.O.P. Platform Seeks To Weaken Powers of Unions, N.Y. TIMES:
CAucus (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.coM/2ol2/o8/30/g-o-p
-platform-seeks-to-weaken-powers-of-unions [http://perma.cc/6ZBM-NFAJ] (describing
the 2012 Republican platform's call for elected officials to reform labor laws in restrictive
ways and "salut[ing] Republican governors and state legislators" who had already taken
such steps).
6. See Governor Walker Introduces Budget Repair, OFF. GovERNoR ScoTT WALKER (Feb.
11, 2011), http://walker.wi.gov/newsroom/press-release/governor-walker-introduces-budget
-repair [http://perma.cc/QC64-LP8T] ("Local law enforcement and fire employees, and
state troopers and inspectors would be exempt from these changes."); Todd Richmond,
Exemptions for Police, Fire Fighters in Walker Budget Bill Sparks Questions of Political Payback,
Nw. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://archive.thenorthwestern.cof/article/2011o24/OSHolo1
/110214045/Exemptions-police-fire-fighters-Walker-budget-bill-sparks-questions-political
-payback [http://perma.cc/M8KE-95Y9].
7. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 705 F-3d 640, 665 (7th Cit. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 652 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wis. Educ. Ass'n
Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 876 n.17 (W.D. Wis. 2012)), affd in part, rev'd in
part, Walker, 705 F-3d 640.
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impossible for his opponents to repeal it."' Or, as President Roosevelt himself
put it, "[N]o damn politician can ever scrap my [S]ocial [S]ecurity program."10
Labor law and Social Security are hardly unique. A vast literature in the
social sciences explores the multifarious means by which political actors
insulate themselves and their policies from political change. Examples range
widely. In economics, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have argued that
the single greatest impediment to economic growth throughout world history
has been the conservatism of entrenched elites who fear that "creative
destruction" in the economic sphere could unsettle their dominance in the
political sphere." Less dramatically, in legislative contexts ranging from tax
reform and emissions trading to the Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank,
political scientists have described how progressive reformers seek to "refashion
the political context" in order to "entrench and deepen" their major policy
initiatives." Another influential body of work describes how, following the lead
of New Deal Democrats who sought to build their policy gains into the
structure of the administrative state, temporarily prevailing political coalitions
seek to manipulate administrative structure and process in order to "stack the
deck" in favor of their preferred outcomes.
Legal scholars not infrequently draw upon, and even contribute to, these
lines of interdisciplinary work. Yet there has been almost no recognition that
the functional entrenchment strategies being described serve the same
purposes as the formal entrenchment echniques that public law regulates. Nor
is there recognition that the democratic concerns invoked against formal
entrenchment are equally applicable when identical outcomes are achieved
functionally.
Public law's normative perspective on political entrenchment is puzzling in
another respect as well. If locking in political arrangements and binding the
hands of future decision makers is a democratically dubious enterprise, then
9. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 15 (1999).
io. Paul Starr, Three Degrees of Entrenchment: Power, Policy, Structure 31-32 (Sept. 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
ii. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 84 (2012).
12. Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, The Struggle To Remake Politics: Liberal Reform and the
Limits ofPolicy Feedback in the Contemporary American State, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1072
(2013). See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR
POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED (2008).
13. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 433-44 (1989) (examining how legislators assure "agency compliance with the
desires of the political coalition enacting and overseeing legislation").
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what are we to make of constitutionalism? One of the primary purposes of the
Constitution and constitutional law, after all, is to entrench rights, rules, and
structures of government against ordinary political change. To be sure, the
entrenched authority of the Constitution has provoked generations of
handwringing about the antidemocratic implications of constitutional
constraints on present majority rule. On the whole, however, constitutional
entrenchment is widely accepted. Indeed, it is celebrated, for its contributions
to democratic stability, rights protection, and the historical continuity of the
American political community. What is it, then, that leads courts and scholars
to treat constitutional entrenchment as a qualitatively different phenomenon
than entrenchment at the electoral and legislative levels?
In sum, the existing picture of political entrenchment in public law is both
partial and internally inconsistent. Courts and scholars have maintained an
oddly myopic focus on entrenchment strategies that operate through explicit
legal rules aimed at processes of political change, while turning a blind, or at
least uncritical, eye to the vastly more expansive domain of political
entrenchment. And even within that limited field of vision, public law has
regarded legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as distinct and
self-contained phenomena, ignoring both their functional and normative
similarities.
To illustrate, imagine a political coalition committed to stringent and
sustained environmental regulation to prevent climate change.' Imagine
further that the coalition has attained sufficient power at the federal level to
take various kinds of political action. Finally, imagine that the coalition fears
that its hold on power will be fleeting, and that antiregulatory political forces
will eventually regain dominance in federal politics and seek to reverse the
environmental policies enacted by their predecessors. Here are four strategies
the coalition might contemplate to entrench their program against repeal. Least
likely, it could attempt to enact a constitutional amendment that guarantees
certain measures of environmental protection. Operating at the sub-
constitutional level, it could attempt to enact an unrepealable environmental
statute. Taking a less direct approach, it might instead manipulate the rules of
election law to favor its own candidates and voters over the opposition's and
therefore retain political control and the power to continue its regulatory
agenda. Finally, it might pursue a range of functional entrenchment strategies.
It could create a tradeable emissions program that would facilitate the
formation of interest groups with a stake in preserving and expanding the
14. See infra notes 221-228 and accompanying text; cf Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153
(2009).
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prevailing regulatory regime. It might try to drive polluting industries offshore
and out of the American political process. Or it could delegate expansive
regulatory authority to a politically sympathetic agency like the Environmental
Protection Agency, which might be more insulated from change than the
political branches. All of these different strategies might be viewed by the
coalition as functional substitutes -more or less interchangeable mechanisms
for accomplishing the same basic purpose. But public law would view them as
quite distinct, as a matter of both legal rules and normative democratic theory.
This Article questions what, if anything, justifies this differential treatment.
At a descriptive level, it catalogues and compares the range of legal and political
techniques through which parties, politicians, and policies are insulated against
contestation and change. At a normative level, it raises questions about
whether and when political entrenchment of various kinds should be regarded
as a matter of concern in public law and what exactly the concern should be.
More specifically, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys how the
phenomenon of political entrenchment has been defined and regulated as a
matter of public law. Entrenchment comes into view when political actors
intentionally create legal impediments to political change. Beyond the special
case of constitutionalism, public law has recognized and regulated this
behavior primarily in two contexts.
One is election law, where scholars have increasingly viewed the
entrenchment of incumbent officeholders, political parties, and majority
coalitions as the central problem that legal regulation of the political process
should be designed to solve. Although courts have not yet fashioned doctrinal
tools aimed explicitly at preventing or remedying entrenchment, judges and
Justices have joined in the scholarly skepticism and in some cases have found
ways of striking down election rules that seemed to have the purpose and effect
of suppressing democratic competition and protecting power holders against
political challenge. The doctrinal prohibition on entrenchment is more explicit
in the second context of legislative entrenchment. It has long been understood
that legislatures are not permitted to enact unrepealable statutes or to insulate
statutes against repeal or revision by way of supermajority rules or other special
procedural requirements. The blurry boundaries of this prohibition have been
interpreted inconsistently by judges and scholars, who have invoked it to cast
doubt on a whole range of laws, from government contracts to framework
statutes and the Senate filibuster.
Courts and scholars have understood electoral and legislative entrenchment
as separate and independent phenomena, but it may be more illuminating to
view them as pieces of a larger puzzle. Political actors use electoral
entrenchment to accomplish indirectly what legislative entrenchment




POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT AND PUBLIC LAW
Electoral and legislative entrenchment (as well as constitutional
entrenchment) are created by means of formal legal rules governing processes
of political change-the rules governing voting and elections, the enactment or
repeal of legislation, and constitutional adoption and amendment. Yet, as Part
II describes, politicians, parties, and policies can be entrenched through
functional, political mechanisms just as readily as through formal, legal ones.
Developing and drawing upon a wide range of examples, this Part synthesizes
three general mechanisms of functional entrenchment. First, politicians,
parties, and temporarily prevailing coalitions can enact substantive policies that
strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents. Second, they can
enact policies or programs that change the composition of the political
community, selecting in allies or selecting out opponents. Third, they can shift
the locus of political decision making to an actor or institution that is
responsive to allies or unresponsive to opponents. These functional strategies
appear to be close substitutes for formal electoral, legislative, and constitutional
entrenchment, and there is every reason to believe they are widely used by
political actors to accomplish the same ends.
Why does public law view formal entrenchment as a form of democratic
failure and an attractive target for legal regulation while treating functional
entrenchment largely as a matter of normative and legal indifference? Part III
takes up this question, considering whether the apparent inconsistency can be
explained or rationalized. Perhaps formal entrenchment is more harmful to
democratic values, less susceptible to benign or beneficial uses, or simply easier
to identify and police? Section III.A considers these possibilities but finds them
less than fully persuasive. The remainder of Part III goes further in a skeptical
direction. Section III.B.1 asks whether there is any good reason for viewing
constitutional entrenchment more favorably than legislative or electoral
entrenchment, or even for treating it as a different category. Section III.B.2
raises the question of whether, once we recognize that political entrenchment is
not limited to formal entrenchment, the concept has any clear outer boundaries
or coherent core. A unifying theme of the discussion in Part III -amplified in
the Conclusion-is the need for a broader perspective on impediments to
political change and assessments of their costs and benefits or democratic
legitimacy.
The progression of the argument along these lines leads to a shift in
perspective that it may be helpful to foreshadow. Our main thrust is to show
that the formal arrangements commonly described by the term "entrenchment"
have functional analogues that are driven by the same motivations and have
similar effects. For this purpose, we proceed on the assumption that "political
entrenchment" is an adequately -even if not always clearly or consistently -
defined phenomenon. Our argument is that on any plausible understanding of
entrenchment, there will be innumerable political phenomena that fit the bill,
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beyond the narrow band of formal entrenchment. Once we push past the
formal markers of electoral and legislative entrenchment to focus on the
functional goals and mechanisms that might be viewed as entrenching,
however, the boundaries of the category of "political entrenchment" and the
features that are supposed to distinguish it from ordinary or desirable
democratic politics begin to fade. By appreciating the potential breadth of the
category of entrenchment, this Article not only expands our understanding of
that phenomenon but also ultimately calls into question its meaning and
utility.
1. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC LAW
A. What Is Political Entrenchment?
Political "entrenchment" is discussed more often than it is defined, and it is
not clear that any single definition captures all uses of the term. At the most
general level, "entrenchment" means that political change has been made more
difficult than it otherwise would (or should) be."s "Political change" is
obviously a broad category. At the level of constitutionalism, the relevant
objects of stasis and change include the structure of government, the
boundaries and allocation of governmental powers, and the set of rules and
rights prohibiting specific governmental actions. At the subconstitutional evel,
political change can mean change in which politicians or parties are elected to
office or change in the substantive policy outcomes generated by these power
holders and their supporters.
Impediments to political change can take a number of different forms.
Public lawyers tend to focus on formal, procedural barriers to change, such as
the Article V requirements of dual supermajorities for constitutional
amendment or a hypothetical statute that deems itself unrepealable. The legal
rules governing political change through the democratic process are also a
common target of entrenchment concerns. Parties that disfranchise or suppress
the political speech of opponents, incumbent legislators who gerrymander
electoral districts to ensure their own reelection, and dictators who outlaw
opposition parties or cancel elections altogether are all engaged in projects of
political entrenchment, manipulating the ground rules of the democratic
process in order to retain their hold on power.
408
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As we shall emphasize, however, manipulating formal rules is not the only
way to prevent change. After all, dictators can imprison or shoot their
opponents rather than disfranchise them. Less dramatically, parties, politicians,
and policies can create political, rather than legal, impediments to change.
Recall the introductory example of labor law reform: incumbents can entrench
themselves in office not only through gerrymandering or franchise restrictions
but also by incapacitating the electoral organization of the political opposition.
Or recall the example of Social Security: the program is difficult to retrench not
because of any legal barrier to repeal, but because the enactment of the
program mobilized and empowered defenders to stave off subsequent political
attacks.'
Whatever form impediments to political change might take, to qualify as
"impediments" they must be distinguishable from the expected workings of
the political process. Political entrenchment implies not just the absence of
political change but some kind of special constraint on the usual processes of
political change. Thus, the persistence of politicians or parties in office, or the
preservation of particular policies over long periods of time, is not necessarily
proof of entrenchment. If politicians, parties, or policies are retained simply
because they continue to be popular among the electorate, this would not be
viewed as entrenchment. Entrenchment implies that the political system is not
responsive to changes in voters' preferences; a system that is perfectly
responsive to unchanging preferences would be viewed as a well-functioning
democracy.7
Thus, notwithstanding conventional claims to the contrary, it is possible
that Social Security has proven politically durable simply because political
support for the goal of providing financial security for people in old age has not
diminished over the past eighty years. If this were the complete explanation for
the program's survival, we should not think of Social Security as entrenched
any more than we think of criminal laws against homicide as entrenched."
Both might endure simply because they remain consistent with the first-order
political preferences of a (super)majority of citizens. The perception that Social
Security is entrenched stems from the view that, in contrast to prohibitions on
murder, a present majority might not vote to reenact the program in anything
like its current form. The program persists, in this view, because it is now
defended by a powerful interest group, brought into being by the program
i6. See supra notes 9-1o and accompanying text.
17. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REv. 657, 702 (2011); see also Starr, supra note lo, at 1
("Entrenchment is not the same as persistence, though it can be one of its causes . . .
18. Levinson, supra note 17, at 702.
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itself, which has proven capable of preventing present majority preferences
from prevailing.
Other kinds of impediments to political change blur the boundary between
entrenchment and ordinary politics. Suppose that Social Security persists not
(just) because of interest group mobilization but because of its increasing
popularity over time, as Americans have learned from their experience under
the program that mandatory savings for retirement is more beneficial than they
initially imagined. One could view this dynamic of endogenous preference
change as a mechanism of entrenchment on the theory that this kind of path-
dependent increase in political support should count as a special impediment to
ordinary political change. Or suppose that critical support for preserving Social
Security stems from the expectation among workers that the earmarked taxes
they have paid into the program are now owed to them by the government
upon retirement, or by the reliance of many Americans on the existence of
Social Security payments to support their retirement, leading them not to save
through other vehicles." One could also view these kinds of adaptive
preference shifts as mechanisms of entrenchment.
For the purposes of this Article, however, we will work with a more limited
definition of entrenchment. Rather than regarding some kinds of shifts in
preferences as creating entrenchment barriers, we shall take individual political
preferences, regardless of how they have been shaped or t ansformed, as given.
Furthermore, we shall accept the satisfaction of present majority will -again,
"black boxed" with respect to the process of its formation - as a benchmark for
well-functioning democracy. Only impediments to giving effect to present
majority will, such as supermajority rules for revising statutes or political
dynamics like the mobilization of a powerful interest group, will be taken as
examples of entrenchment.20
Identifying this kind of entrenchment requires some baseline conception of
ordinary, unconstrained processes of political change. In the public law
literature on entrenchment, two kinds of "ordinary politics" baselines are
commonly in play.'
One is the process for, or political difficulty of, effecting change through
some alternative channel, usually one that is more responsive to majority will. '
ig. On these alternative explanations for the political entrenchment of Social Security, see Starr,
supra note io, at 31-33.
20. See infra Section III.B.2 for a discussion of this limited definition of entrenchment.
21. See infra Section III.B.2, which revisits these definitional baselines and questions their
utility in demarcating a limited category of entrenchment. For now, we are attempting a
working definition.
22. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 498 (conceptualizing entrenchment as antimajoritarian).
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For example, when constitutional law in the United States is described as
entrenched, reference is typically made to the "supermajorities" needed to
effect constitutional change, in contrast to the "majorities" needed to enact a
statute. This is obviously a highly stylized, even formalistic, vision of how
actual lawmaking processes operate. With respect to statutes, we might push
past the caricature of "majority rule" to notice, for example, the different
majorities implicated by electing senators, representatives, and the President,
and the likely supermajorities necessary to assemble a prevailing legislative
coalition. Moreover, the procedural barriers to statutory enactment would be
only part of a functional assessment of political difficulty, which would depend
on many other variables - the formation and alignment of coalitions, the ability
of interest groups to block action, internal legislative procedures and agenda-
setting power, and much else." For present purposes, however, the important
thing to see is that the baseline being used to define entrenchment is the (more
or less hypothetical) alternative of effecting political change through some
process that (better) tracks the preferences of democratic majorities or the
median voter.
A different "ordinary politics" baseline is set by the degree of difficulty of
creating the status quo. Under this standard, entrenchment means that a political
arrangement is now more difficult to change than it was to create in the first
place.' On this definition, it is no longer clear that the U.S. Constitution
should count as entrenched, because it is not obvious that the
supermajoritarian procedures required for amendment are a higher hurdle than
the supermajoritarian procedures the Constitution had to overcome in the
course of its initial enactment." Likewise, an unpopular incumbent who cannot
be dislodged from office is not entrenched if she originally had to defeat a
similarly advantaged predecessor to win her post.
In many cases the two criteria for identifying entrenchment converge. In
the paradigmatic case of legislative entrenchment, for example, a statute
23. For a discussion of these complexities and their consequences for the way we might think
about entrenchment, see infra Section III.B.2.
24. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, iii YALE L.J.
1665, 1667 (2002) (defining legislative entrenchment as "the enactment of either statutes or
internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same
form" (emphasis added)); see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric
Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REv. 385, 388-89 (2003)
(distinguishing between "symmetric" and "asymmetric" entrenchment).
25. The unamendable requirement that no state be denied equal suffrage in the Senate is an
exception. See U.S. CONsT. art. V. That provision is procedurally more difficult to repeal
than it was to enact. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 24, at 411-15; Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1681-82.
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enacted by majority vote specifies that a supermajority is required for revision
or repeal, combining an upward departure from the absolute standard of
majority rule with an upward departure from the relative standard for initial
enactment. Likewise, in the paradigmatic case of electoral entrenchment, a
party or coalition manipulates the rules of election law upon gaining office-for
instance, by disfranchising opponents or reducing their voting power-such
that a subsequent majority of voters who would prefer to replace the
incumbents will be thwarted. If that same majority would have been sufficient
to prevent the incumbents from being elected in the first place, then both
criteria of entrenchment are satisfied. Most of the examples this Article
discusses qualify as entrenched according to both baselines. Social Security, for
instance, might be classified as entrenched both by reference to present
majority will and by reference to the initial difficulty of the program's
enactment, prior to the formation of a mobilized group of vested beneficiaries
and supporters.
Public law has primarily focused on entrenchment as an intentional
strategy,26 and most of the examples we discuss are of this sort.' The
intentionality of entrenchment is often associated with bad motives, as when
parties and politicians engage in self-serving efforts to suppress competition
and maintain their hold on power. But intentional entrenchment need not be
self-serving. As the literature on constitutionalism emphasizes, there are
perfectly respectable, public-regarding reasons for entrenchment.
Constitutions, in common with other mechanisms of entrenchment, facilitate
enduring political commitments (or "precommitments"), protecting
normatively preferred policies from being undermined by shortsighted or
otherwise pathological decision making." Constitutional and other forms of
entrenchment also promote political coordination and stability, reducing the
costs of both conflict and transition.
Criticisms of entrenchment are also familiar from the literature on
constitutionalism. Entrenched policies and political arrangements arguably
substitute rule by the "dead hand" of the past for rule by present majorities,
26. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1998) (exploring "ways in which dominant
parties manage to lock up political institutions to forestall competition"); Klarman, supra
note 4, at 502 (starting from the assumption that "legislators strongly prefer to remain in
office").
27. Section III.B.2 revisits intentionality as a criterion of entrenchment.
28. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 88-174 (2000); STEPHEN HOLMEs, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT 134-77 (1995).
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threatening democratic ideals of popular sovereignty and self-government.'
The dubious democratic legitimacy of entrenchment goes hand in hand with
practical concerns about preventing the current political community from
responding to changed circumstances or shifting values by locking in bad or
anachronistic policy decisions. We return to the costs and benefits of political
entrenchment below."o
B. Two Forms ofPolitical Entrenchment
Bracketing the special case of constitutionalism," public law has grappled
most extensively with political entrenchment in two contexts. Electoral
entrenchment involves efforts by parties and politicians to entrench themselves
in office by manipulating the rules of democratic politics. Such efforts have
been generally frowned upon by courts and commentators, and scholars have
called for broad swathes of election law jurisprudence to be reoriented toward
preventing political entrenchment of this kind. Moving from elections to
governance, it has long been assumed that "legislative" entrenchment-
including, at a minimum, the enactment of statutes that cannot be revised or
repealed by a majority of a subsequent legislature-is constitutionally
impermissible and democratically illegitimate.
1. Electoral Entrenchment
In democratic politics, power holders-whether incumbents, political
parties, or electoral coalitions-will often possess the means and motivation to
preserve their privileged positions by rigging the rules of the electoral system.
In some cases, the desire of elected officials to entrench themselves in office
may lead them to act contrary to the preferences of their constituents. Thus,
term limits have found little support among incumbent state legislators, who
predictably lack enthusiasm for voting themselves out of a job., In other cases,
officeholders and their constituents will share a common interest in
perpetuating their hold on power and in fending off political challenges from
2g. See DAVID A. STRAuss, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 99-102 (2010).
30. See infra Part III.
31. We return to constitutionalism infra Section III.B.i.
32. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 509-13. Even where clear majorities or supermajorities of
voters support term limits, in most jurisdictions the only route to their enactment has been
through initiative and referendum processes that bypass legislatures. See id. at 510.
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opposing parties or coalitions.' Both types of electoral entrenchment are
viewed as predictable pathologies of the democratic political process and
problems that law might help to solve.
Electoral entrenchment strategies take many different forms. The most
straightforward is simply to prevent one's opponents or their supporters from
casting ballots, while enfranchising as many of one's own supporters as
possible. Thus, after the Civil War, Republicans in Congress sought to
enfranchise black voters in the South, partly for moral and ideological reasons,
but also to ensure the electoral dominance of their party.' The end of
Reconstruction allowed Southern Democrats to turn the tables, using force,
fraud, poll taxes, literacy tests, and other tactics to disfranchise virtually all
black voters and many poor whites, thereby restoring and entrenching their
own political supremacy." Through the 196os (and perhaps beyond), black
disfranchisement was used as a tool of entrenchment for the Democratic party
in the South; factions within the party; elected officials who might be
vulnerable to defeat by black voters (or biracial coalitions); and, of course,
white majorities, which were able to maintain political and social dominance by
monopolizing control over government. In recent elections, voter ID laws,
more stringent registration requirements, the curtailment of early voting, and
other procedural regulations have been supported or opposed based in large
part on their predictable effects on the racial and partisan composition of the
electorate: Democrats accuse Republicans of supporting voter ID and similar
procedural requirements in order to disproportionately exclude Democratic
voters, while Republicans accuse Democrats of opposing voter ID laws so that
more illegal ballots will be cast in favor of Democrats.
33. See id. at 498 (distinguishing the former kind of "agency" problem from the problem of
"cross-temporal majorities," while portraying both as problematic forms of electoral
entrenchment).
34. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE 87-104 (2000); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 28-29 (2004).
3s. See KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 105-16. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
36. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 660-66 (describing how white conservative elites
in Texas and elsewhere in the South used black disfranchisement o entrench their control
over the Democratic Party and the Party's control over the state).
37. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 324-30
(2014) (describing the new array of franchise restrictions and their partisan
consequences); see also Maggie Haberman & Amy Chozick, Democrats Wage a National Fight
over Voter Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o6
/o4/us/politics/democrats-voter-rights-lawsuit-hillary-clinton.html [http://perma.cc/55HQ
-BMCL] (describing the burgeoning legal battles over voter access restrictions and
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Another time-honored technique for tilting the electoral playing field is
manipulating the number, size, and boundaries of electoral districts-the
infamous gerrymander. Before the Supreme Court required equipopulosity of
legislative districts, legislators elected from malapportioned districts resisted
any change in district boundaries, just as constituents in overrepresented
districts resisted reapportionment schemes that would reduce their
representation." Along with at-large and multimember districting schemes,
gerrymandering was a key line-drawing tool used by white majorities,
incumbent legislators, and the Democratic Party in the South to suppress black
voting power and preserve political hegemony.39 Partisan gerrymanders remain
a staple of contemporary politics, permitting parties to leverage temporary or
slight legislative majorities into enduring or decisive control without the
trouble of attracting more votes.40 Alternatively, legislators who manage to
overcome their partisan differences and cooperate across party lines have the
opportunity to agree on districting schemes designed to preserve the safety of
their seats - so-called "bipartisan" or "incumbent" gerrymanders.4 '
Many other levers of electoral entrenchment are available to strategic
political actors. Political parties that gain effective control of government can
regulate the party structure of elections and have done so with predictable
attention to the prospects for their own electoral success - for example, by
requiring closed primaries when their competitor party would benefit from an
open primary structure.' Or, the two major parties can collaborate to protect
their "duopoly" by using cumbersome ballot access requirements,' bans on
their partisan stakes in the 2016 presidential election cycle); Richard L.
Hasen, The Voting Wars Heat Up, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/jurisprudence/2o14/o9/voting-restrictions may
_reach-the-supreme-court fromohio wisconsinnorth.html [http://perma.cc/6FzF
-9FXM] (surveying litigation over restrictive voting legislation and stressing the partisan
stakes).
38. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 513-15.
3g. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 700-03.
40. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 348-49 (presenting evidence that, in recent decades,
parties with full control over state governments have enacted districting plans that award
themselves six percent more seats on average than the plan that would have resulted if the
opposing party had been in charge of redistricting); see also id. at 286 (suggesting that
gerrymandering helped Republicans keep their majority in the House in 2012 despite
receiving 1.4 million fewer votes nationwide than Democrats).
41. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 515-16.
42. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L.
REv. 28, 102 n.298 (2004).
43. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 521-23.
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fusion candidacies,' or "sore loser" laws to prevent entry by third parties or
independent candidates.4s Campaign finance regulation offers yet another
tempting instrument for suppressing competition and securing political power,
allowing incumbents or temporarily dominant parties to channel money to
themselves and away from challengers, while also helping corporations and
wealthy donors protect their preferred policies against challenges from less
wealthy constituencies .46
Courts have intervened in all of these areas, developing an elaborate
jurisprudence governing many facets of the electoral process. Poll taxes, literacy
tests, and other instruments of minority disfranchisement have been
invalidated.47 The constitutional rule of "one person, one vote" now governs
the drawing of electoral districts.8 Race-conscious gerrymandering is
mandated by the Voting Rights Act to ensure a measure of minority
representation, but also constrained by the Equal Protection Clause to avoid
overly or too overtly race-based decision making.49 The Supreme Court has
deemed political gerrymandering a constitutionally cognizable problem, albeit
one for which the Justices have not been able to agree upon a judicially
manageable solution.so Most limitations on campaign spending, beyond the
regulation of direct contributions to candidates, have been invalidated as
44. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 683-86; Pildes, supra note 42, at 117-26.
45. See Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J. 1013, 1042-58
(2011).
46. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 522-23; Pildes, supra note 42, at 130-53.
47. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (invalidating a multimember
districting scheme for its discriminatory effect on black voters); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970) (reaffirming Congress's ban on literacy tests as a valid
antidiscrimination measure); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966)
(upholding sections of the Voting Rights Act that restricted literacy tests for certain non-
English speaking citizens); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966)
(holding that Virginia's poll tax violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
48. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558-71 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1964).
49. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, So9 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that redistricting based on race is
evaluated under strict scrutiny, yet requiring redistricting to be race-conscious to ensure
compliance with the Voting Rights Act).
so. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (deciding, in a split decision
with no majority opinion, not to intervene in a congressional redistricting plan); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 1o9 (1986) (holding that political gerrymandering claims are
justiciable, but without a majority agreement upon a standard to govern such claims).
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violations of free speech." Some types of regulations of political parties and
ballot access limitations have also been rejected as unconstitutional.52
While many of these judicial interventions have had the effect of limiting
opportunities for political entrenchment, entrenchment has not typically been
the doctrinal focus. Instead, courts have tended to frame their role as enforcing
individual rights, leaving systemic concerns like preserving political
competition and preventing entrenchment mostly offstage.5  Nonetheless,
recognition and disapproval of electoral entrenchment not infrequently bubble
to the surface of judicial opinions. Motivating the Court's initial decision to
enter the "political thicket" was the recognition that malapportionment
threatened "systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate,"4
and that "entrenched political regimes" prevented a legislative solution.55
Courts have been especially skeptical of ballot access restrictions imposed upon
third parties and independent candidates when these restrictions "operate to
freeze the political status quo."56 In a Seventh Circuit decision ultimately
affirmed by the Supreme Court, an Indiana voter ID law was upheld over a
dissent that described the law as "a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage
election-day turnout by certain folk believed to skew Democratic."' Expressing
s. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc., v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (declaring Ohio's filing deadline for
independent candidates unconstitutional); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding
that Ohio's restrictive ballot access laws violated the equal protection clause by effectively
limiting access to the two major parties).
53. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 644-46, 717; Pildes, supra note 42, at 40-41.
54. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see also Klarman, supra note 4, at 531-32.
ss. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 248 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 553-54, 570 (1964) (noting that the entrenchment of the Alabama legislature
prevented the development of a solution to alleged malapportionment); Klarman, supra
note 4, at 531.
56. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971); see also Klarman, supra note 4, at 535-36. The
Supreme Court has invalidated a closed primary requirement imposed on the minority
Republican Party by the Democratic-controlled legislature, i.e., "the one political party
transiently enjoying majority power." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. zo8,
224 (1986).
57. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J.,
dissenting), affd, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). Judge Posner, who authored the majority opinion for
the Seventh Circuit panel, subsequently came to share the dissenting view. Referencing the
"ferocity" of party competition, Judge Posner admitted in an interview that he "wasn't alert
to this kind of trickery, even though it's age old in the democratic process." John Schwartz,
Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 15, 2013),
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skepticism of campaign finance regulation, Justice Scalia has warned that
"[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a
Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the
suppression of election-time speech."s8 And Justice Breyer has explained the
constitutional problem with partisan gerrymanders in terms of "[t]he
democratic harm of unjustified entrenchment," evidenced by a redistricting
plan that awards a party receiving a minority of statewide votes a majority of
legislative seats."
Prominent election law scholars have been more overtly and consistently
focused on entrenchment as a central concern for legal regulation of the
political process. For example, Michael Klarman argues that courts should
commit themselves to policing the dual entrenchment problems of
representatives perpetuating their hold on office by acting contrary to the
wishes of their constituents and temporary political majorities seeking to
extend their hold on power into the future.6 o To this end, Klarman develops a
framework for "anti-entrenchment review" of districting, disfranchisement,
ballot access restrictions, campaign finance reform, and other areas of election
law.6' Klarman's approach is motivated by an overarching commitment to the
democratic value of majority rule, which he sees as threatened whenever
officials contradict the preferences of a majority of citizens or when the will of a
present majority is thwarted by entrenched arrangements.2 Similarly focused
on the problem of entrenchment, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes
emphasize the need to maintain political competition and to guard against
"political lockups" perpetrated by "existing holders of political power [who]
seek to perpetuate their control . . . by capturing the basic structures and
ground rules of politics itself."6 ' As Pildes elaborates, judicial intervention is
justified "whenever self-interested political actors employ political power to




58. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
59. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 361 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6o. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 498.
61. See id. at 528-39.
62. See id. at 502-09.
63. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 648, 650.
64. Pildes, supra note 42, at 46.
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2. Legislative Entrenchment
It has long been conventional wisdom among constitutional awyers that
"one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors."s6 More
specifically, a legislature may not "entrench" a law by forbidding subsequent
repeal or amendment, or by imposing heightened procedural hurdles, such as
supermajority voting rules that were not necessary to enact the law in the first
place.66 For example, Congress would not be permitted to enact a statute
requiring a balanced federal budget "in perpetuity," or with an attached
prohibition on repeal, or a prohibition on repeal by less than a two-thirds
majority. If Congress did enact such a statute, the purported entrenchment
would presumably be invalidated by courts (to the extent they would find the
issue justiciable). And it could be legally ignored by subsequent Congresses:
notwithstanding the statutory language, a congressional majority in pursuit of
an unbalanced budget would be free to repeal or override the preexisting
statute pursuant to the standard second-in-time rule. This, at least, is the
consensus view among constitutional theorists.
The precise source of the anti-entrenchment principle in U.S.
constitutional law has never been entirely clear. Aversion to legislative
entrenchment has a long history in British constitutional thought, where-at
least in theory, if not always in practice68 - " [t]here is no law which Parliament
cannot change"69 and "[a]cts of parliament derogatory from the power of
subsequent parliaments bind not."'o But the British version of the anti-
entrenchment principle developed as a corollary of parliamentary supremacy,
and so it does not obviously translate to the American legal system, in which
65. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion) (referencing i
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90).
66. Thus, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule define legislative entrenchment as "the enactment
of either statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative
action in the same form." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1667.
67. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 na- (3d ed. 2ooo);
David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment
and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the
Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 185 (1986). But see
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24 (arguing that there is no basis for a rule against legislative
entrenchment).
68. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1678.
69. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION 84 (8th ed.
1915).
70. 1 WHLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90.
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the legislature is subordinate to the Constitution.' In its American incarnation,
the prohibition on legislative entrenchment seems to have been recast as a
means of marking the contrast between entrenched constitutional law and
ordinary law lacking this definitive constitutional characteristic. As Laurence
Tribe once testified to Congress, "Only by a constitutional amendment can one
truly bind the future: unless we keep clearly in mind that distinction between a
constitutional amendment and a bill or resolution, we have really lost our
way."7 2
As a textual matter, the anti-entrenchment principle has been variously
grounded in some combination of the Article I grant of limited legislative
powers, the provisions of Article I specifying limited terms of office for
congressional representatives, and Article V, which has been understood as
creating an exclusive pathway for supra-statutory entrenchment.3 The
Supreme Court has enforced the rule in a handful of cases, though without
much explication of its constitutional source, justification, or scope. For
instance, in holding that the Ohio State Legislature was free to change the
location of a county seat notwithstanding a preexisting statute that had
"permanently established" the existing seat,' the Court explained:
Every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power
with respect to [the public interest] as its predecessors. The latter have
the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of
enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy, in this respect, a footing
of perfect equality. This must necessarily be so in the nature of things.
It is vital to the public welfare that each one should be able at all times
to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies
touching the subject involved may require. A different result would be
fraught with evil."
Although the prohibition on statutory entrenchment has gone largely
untested -neither Congress nor state and local legislatures appear to have
71. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion); Eule, supra
note 67, at 393.
72. Extending the Ratification Period for the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on H.R.J.
Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 51 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Laurence H. Tribe,
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
73. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1680-95 (critically surveying these and other
textually grounded arguments).
74. Newton v. Comm'rs, 1oo U.S. 548, 561 (1879).
7s. Id. at 559.
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attempted anything like this very often76 - the anti-entrenchment principle has
been extended to analogous legislative acts that are more prevalent in the real
world. For example, the principle has been invoked to criticize the
entrenchment of the Senate's cloture rule requiring sixty votes to end a
filibuster, and to argue that, as a constitutional matter, a simple majority must
be empowered to end filibusters.n The principle has also been cited in
objections to "framework" statutes like the Gramm-Rudman Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the War Powers Resolution, which seek to
impose constraints upon, or take presumptive priority over, downstream
legislative decision making. Scholars have also raised anti-entrenchment
objections to the creation of property rights protected against subsequent
confiscation by compensation requirements" and to consent decrees that lock
80
in government policies against subsequent revision.
As far as courts have been concerned, the anti-entrenchment principle has
had the most purchase in the constitutional law of government contracting.
Judicial enforcement of contracts entered into by earlier legislatures against
their successors pursuant to the Contracts and Takings Clauses looks
suspiciously similar to legislative entrenchment.8 , Since the early Republic, the
76. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1678-79.
77. See Eule, supra note 67, at 407-15; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49
STAN. L. REv. 181, 250 (1997); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1694-95; John C.
Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors
Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAUF. L.REV. 1773, 1780-81 (2003).
78. Cf Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REv.
1011 (2010) (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and the War Powers Resolution);
Kahn, supra note 67 (discussing the Gramm-Rudman Act); Posner & Vermeule, supra note
24, at 1695-97 (discussing the Gramm-Rudman Act). Statutes that purport to create rules of
statutory interpretation or construction for downstream statutes, such as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act or the Defense of Marriage Act, might also count as examples of
legislative entrenchment. See TRIBE, supra note 67, at 125-26 n.1; Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98-99, 1o8 (2004); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1697-99;
see also Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 147-49 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(expressing the view that a statutory requirement of express reference for override should be
treated as nonbinding). For a conflicting view, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 11s HARv. L. REV. 2085, 2117-20 (2002), which finds no
entrenchment problem with congressional enactment of prospective rules of statutory
interpretation.
79. For a useful description, see Serkin, supra note 3, at 898-99.
so. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees To Insulate Policies
from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295.
81. See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 67, at 478-79 (discussing the permissibility of
government contracts with private industry to raise revenue by "selling law-making
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Supreme Court has been of two minds about the enforceability of such
contracts. In some cases, the Court has taken the view that contracts between
governments and private parties should be fully enforceable, emphasizing the
public-regarding benefits of contractual commitment, the risk of political
opportunism, and the reliance interests of private actors.2 Even while
enforcing contracts, however, the Court has struggled to distinguish the anti-
entrenchment principle that "one legislature is competent to repeal any act
which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature."8 This principle attains
primacy in cases where the Court has refused to enforce government contracts,
taking the view that the government cannot contract away sovereign authority.
In those cases, the Court emphasizes the possibility of corrupt or imprudent
contractual obligations, the need for responding to changed circumstances,
and, above all, the democratic imperative of contemporaneous self-
governance.4
Scholars have embraced and amplified these normative concerns as applied
to legislative entrenchment more broadly. Critics of entrenchment argue that
current legislatures will possess more information than past ones and that
disallowing them from adapting to changed circumstances would lock in
erroneous and anachronistic decisions.8 ' They also argue that legislative
authority"); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
i AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 313, 313-17, 326-32 (1999) (discussing differences between private
parties and the government with regard to available contract remedies); Gillian Hadfield, Of
Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 467, 467 (1999) (describing tension "between the power of government to bind itself
and future governments in contract and the freedom of a democratically elected legislature
to override the acts of a prior legislature in response to evolutions in judgment, information,
or politics").
82. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); New Jersey
v. Wilson, ii U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
83. Fletcher, io U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873
& n.19 (1996) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the principle "that 'a general law ... may be
repealed, amended or disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,' and 'is not binding
upon any subsequent legislature,"' even while enforcing a government contract (quoting
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))).
84. See, e.g., United States Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 33 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Stone v. Mississippi, iol U.S. 814, 817 (1880) (holding that a state legislature cannot bargain
away its police power); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 507 (1848)
(holding that a state cannot contract away its eminent domain power); see also Fischel &
Sykes, supra note 81, at 319 (explaining the "vexing and recurring problem concern[ing] the
government's ability to enter into long-term contracts" as conflicting with the constitutional
anti-entrenchment principle).
8s. See Eule, supra note 67, at 387; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 1811-12.
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entrenchment would exacerbate the damage that a badly motivated majority or
one with extreme or aberrational preferences could inflict on the country."
More generally, they argue that, like electoral entrenchment, legislative
entrenchment illegitimately undermines democratic accountability and
majority rule by disempowering legislatures from acting on the preferences of
current majorities. As Julian Eule put it in his foundational argument against
legislative entrenchment, "The fundamental . . . assumption of American
political life -that legislative action reflects current majoritarian preferences -
could be finally laid to rest if shifting majorities were unable to alter prior
majoritarian choices.",8
3. Common Denominators
Courts and scholars have treated electoral and legislative entrenchment as
two separate and distinct phenomena.8" The conspicuous difference between
entrenching parties and politicians in office, on the one hand, and entrenching
enacted statutes and the policy decisions they embed, on the other, has struck
most observers as sufficient reason to place electoral and legislative
entrenchment in separate categories.
Upon closer inspection, however, the basis for this categorical distinction
begins to blur. After all, elections matter in large part because they decide who
controls the government and, consequently, the kinds of laws and policies
likely to be generated. Correspondingly, at least one important reason electoral
entrenchment strikes many as problematic is that it permits politicians who
have lost popular political support to enact laws and policies that the median
voter disprefers. If, for example, the Democratic Party can manipulate election
law to retain a majority of seats in a state legislature even after losing
majoritarian support, it might use its power to raise taxes on the rich or legalize
marijuana, despite the fact that most voters and citizens might prefer lower
taxes or oppose legalization. But legislative entrenchment can accomplish the
very same ends, and it raises the very same concerns. Suppose, in our example,
that electoral entrenchment is impossible. In its fleeting moment of
majoritarian ascendance, the Democratic Party, anticipating defeat at the polls
in the next election, might enact unrepealable laws raising taxes and legalizing
86. See Eule, supra note 67, at 388; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 1809-11, 1813.
8s. Eule, supra note 67, at 405; see also Dana & Koniak, supra note 67, at 526-36 ("If majority
rule means anything, it means rule by the current majority and not by a majority of the
past.").
88. But see Klarman, supra note 4, at 504-07 & nn.63-69 (making the connection between
legislative and electoral entrenchment).
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marijuana. Even after Republicans commanded a legislative and electoral
majority, they would be powerless to reverse these policy decisions. Thus, to
the extent that countermajoritarian policymaking is the driving concern,
electoral and legislative entrenchment seem functionally and normatively
equivalent.8 ,
The same point holds in the reverse: when legislative entrenchment or its
equivalent is impossible, electoral entrenchment can serve as a substitute.
Critics of legislative entrenchment worry that a narrow legislative majority
might, for instance, enact a ban on capital punishment and, "knowing that the
voters will be angry and will want to elect pro-death penalty replacements,"
entrench the statute against repeal.90 But these commentators might equally
well worry that the same precarious majority would use the tools of election
law- gerrymandering districts, disfranchising or defunding opponents, and
the like -to defeat their pro-death-penalty opponents and retain office. Either
form of entrenchment would prevent capital punishment from being restored
by an opposed majority.
The simple point is that electoral entrenchment and legislative
entrenchment are substitutable strategies for accomplishing the same basic
result: locking in substantive policy outcomes. Entrenched policy outcomes can
be generated either indirectly through electoral entrenchment or directly
through legislative entrenchment. From the perspective of both political actors
scheming to protect policy outcomes and citizens concerned with what these
policy outcomes will turn out to be, the bottom line is largely the same.9 '
ag. Commentators have recognized that government contracts can be used to lock in both
specific policies and broader party platforms or coalitional agendas:
[A] political party in power might undertake to ensure the survival of its policies
against the contingency of future political defeat by entering contracts that could
make changes in policy extremely expensive. Proregulatory forces might enter
long-term contracts with private entities for expensive regulatory services;
antiregulatory forces might contract with the private sector to reimburse it for the
costs of any future changes in regulation; small-government proponents might
enter contracts promising compensation for any increase in taxes; big-
government proponents might enter long-term employment contracts with
government workers. By making it difficult or impossible to change policies once
put in place, incumbent officials could thwart the possibility of democratic
changes to public policy.
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 81, at 338.
go. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 1798.
91. A corollary observation is that theories of electoral entrenchment that emphasize the
importance of preserving robust partisan competition and preventing partisan lock ups do
not really get to the heart of what is problematic about entrenchment. See Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 26. Imagine that a temporarily ascendant Republican majority in Ohio
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This is not to deny that voters care about the identity or party label of the
representatives they elect to office for reasons independent of the policy
outcomes those representatives are likely to produce. Voters may want to
replace incumbent officeholders who are incompetent, corrupt, or personally
dislikeable, regardless of the consequences for policymaking. To the extent that
voters have policy-independent electoral preferences along these lines, then
some forms of electoral entrenchment will be viewed as problematic on
grounds that have no equivalent when it comes to legislative entrenchment.
Consider, for example, a bipartisan gerrymandering scheme that generates
safe, noncompetitive districts for all incumbents but results in perfectly
proportional representation for the two major parties. Governance outcomes
under such a scheme would continue to reflect the policy preferences of the
electorate, and indeed more voters would find themselves in districts
represented by someone who shared their policy preferences and party
affiliation than if districting were random. Yet incumbent officeholders who
might otherwise have been unseated would be safely entrenched in office.
Many people might prefer a "fair" election, even if the only change would be to
replace those incumbents with co-partisans who would generate similar policy
outcomes.92
enacts a law imposing a wealth requirement for voting, effectively disfranchising all poor
people in the state. The immediate electoral impact of such a law might be to deprive
Democratic candidates of any chance of winning state and federal offices that would
otherwise have been competitive - the Republican Party would be entrenched in power. The
immediate policy impact would be a correspondingly sharp turn to the right as the interests
of poorer voters were discounted, perhaps resulting in reduced spending on welfare
programs, inner-city public schools, and the like.
But the Republican ascendancy would not last forever. Democrats would quickly realize
that their only hope of securing or retaining office would be appealing to the median voter
of this new, wealthier electorate. The Democratic Party in Ohio and individual Democratic
officeholders and candidates would presumably shift their platforms accordingly, moving
them close to the platforms of prevailing Republicans. Eventually, competition and some
sort of rough parity between the parties would be restored, and the entrenchment of
Republicans would come to an end. But- and here is the important point- this would be
cold comfort to supporters of the old Democratic platform and the predisfranchisement
median voter. Whatever the party label of prevailing politicians in the new regime,
governance outcomes would reflect the preferences of the new, wealthy electorate -more
closely resembling the initial Republican coalition, resulting in policies more closely
resembling the initial Republican platform. So long as that group of citizens and that set of
policies remained entrenched, the end of partisan entrenchment seems relatively
unimportant. Cf Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 299-300 (observing that the existence of
competition is no guarantee that electoral outcomes will align with voters' preferences).
92. Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593,
612-30 (2002) (arguing that bipartisan gerrymanders represent a fundamental failure of
competitive democracy), with Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The
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Still, at least a large part of the reason citizens will object when a party,
officeholder, or electoral faction retains power by means of electoral
entrenchment is that the resulting governance outcomes are likely to deviate
from their preferences. And at least as a first approximation, these outcomes
can be generated equally well by entrenching them directly or by entrenching
them indirectly, such as by entrenching their proponents in office. This linkage
between electoral and legislative entrenchment reflects the simple fact that
political power is primarily valuable because of what it can be used to
accomplish.
The linkage operates at a normative level as well. As we have seen, the
perceived pathologies of entrenchment in both categories are nearly identical.
Locking in parties, politicians, and policies alike threatens the democratic value
of rule by present majorities - replacing democratic responsiveness to popular
preferences with dead-hand control of the past and anachronistic or
maladapted governance outcomes. This should come as no surprise. If electoral
and legislative entrenchment create similar functional outcomes, then to the
extent these outcomes are viewed as democratically pathological, the diagnosis
will be the same for both.
II. FROM FORMAL TO FUNCTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT
As the previous Part surveyed, concerns about entrenchment in public law
have been focused on formal legal rules that create impediments to political
change - rules of election law that increase the difficulty of replacing
incumbents or prevailing political parties in office or rules about legislation
that increase the difficulty of revising enacted policies. But political
entrenchment can also be accomplished without any shift in the legal rules
directly governing permissible processes of political change. As this Part
describes, what electoral and legislative entrenchment accomplish formally and
legally can also be accomplished functionally and politically.
A. The Idea ofFunctional Entrenchment
Constitutional theory provides a useful point of entry to the distinction
between formal and functional entrenchment. Constitutional theorists have
long understood that formal, legal entrenchment is "neither necessary nor
Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, n6 HARv. L. REv. 649,
654-73 (2002) (emphasizing that noncompetitive electoral districts can both satisfy voter
preferences and generate proportional representation at the legislative level).
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sufficient to create functional political entrenchment."9 3 Formal entrenchment
of the text does not prevent constitutional change, because constitutional
change need not be channeled through the Article V amendment process.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the most important mechanism of constitutional
change has been through shifting interpretations or constructions of the
meaning of the (formally unchanged) constitutional text by courts, political
actors, and the public.94 Formal entrenchment in the constitutional text is
therefore no guarantee of functional stability.
Conversely, constitutional theorists have emphasized that functional
stability need not depend on formal constitutional status. Thus, theorists have
pointed to a number of norms outside the constitutional text that are treated in
practice as impervious to ordinary political contestation or change-and thus
that might be understood as functionally, even if not formally, constitutional.95
In Bruce Ackerman's view, for example, constitutional norms may be created or
rewritten when the American public is roused to transcend ordinary politics
and engage in a higher-order form of deliberation about the public good. 6
These norms may float free of any particular legal text, or they may be codified
in formally nonconstitutional statutes like the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
1965 Voting Rights Act.97 For Ackerman, what makes these norms
constitutional is not just their special democratic pedigree but also their
invulnerability to ordinary political revision. Thus, Ackerman emphasizes that
"an all-out assault on the Civil Rights Act, or the Voting Rights Act, could not
occur without a massive effort comparable to the political exertions that created
these landmarks in the first place." 8 Similarly seeking to define constitutional
law functionally rather than formally, Ernest Young concludes that the only
interesting and distinctive sense in which some legal norms should be
considered constitutional is that they are "entrenched" against change.99
Among other examples, Young points to the Social Security Act's promise of
93. Levinson, supra note 17, at 697-98.
94. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (011); STRAUSS, supra note 29.
95. Karl Llewellyn, writing in the 1930s, defined our "working [c]onstitution" as the set of
norms and institutional arrangements that political actors treat as "not subject to abrogation
or material alteration." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 28-29 (1934).
96. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
97. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 12o HARv. L. REV. 1737, 1757-93 (2007).
98. Id. at 1788.
99. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 426 (2007).
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government financial support in old age, which he plausibly predicts is less
likely to be "fundamentally altered or abolished over the next ten years" than
canonical constitutional norms like the rights to burn an American flag or get
an abortion."oo
Whatever protects Social Security, the Civil Rights Act, and perhaps other
"superstatutes"'0  from revision or repeal, it is not any kind of formal barrier to
change. These statutes and the arguably "constitutional" norms they embody
are formally susceptible to repeal or revision through the ordinary Article I,
Section 7 procedures. Nonetheless, as these theorists recognize, laws and
policies can be protected by political barriers that may be every bit as difficult
to overcome as constitutional barriers or other formal impediments to
change."o2 These laws and policies are functionally, even if not formally,
entrenched.
But functional entrenchment is hardly limited to a small set of landmark,
quasi-constitutional statutes. For example, critically assessing the prohibition
on legislative entrenchment, Posner and Vermeule observe that other types of
government actions, beyond formal entrenchment, might share the purpose
and effect of altering the downstream political environment in such a way as to
increase the costs of changing course, even to the point of practical
impossibility. They offer the example of a legislature intent on entrenching a
policy against riding bicycles in a park: if barred from enacting an unrepealable
statute, the legislature might instead replace the existing concrete paths in the
park with bicycle-unfriendly gravel, effectively raising the downstream
1o. Id. at 427.
io. Taking a similar approach to Ackerman's and Young's, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
identify as "America's Working Constitution" a set of "superstatutes," including the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, which
created "entrenched governance structures and normative commitments." WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEw AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7 (2010).
102. In fact, as Young suggests, formal barriers may be much less effective in preventing political
and constitutional change than functional ones. More strongly: legal constraints may be
meaningless in the absence of underlying political support. Recall the fear expressed by
James Madison and other designers of the U.S. Constitution that constitutional rights and
rules would create mere "parchment barriers." THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 276 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). Madison recognized that legal prohibitions would
only be meaningful if they could be made politically self-enforcing, by way of political
decision-making processes and institutions that would selectively empower decision makers
with the right interests and incentives. Generalizing the point, constitutional and other
forms of legal entrenchment always depend on the political entrenchment of the relevant
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financial and political costs of bringing back the cyclists.o3 Here, a functional
mechanism of entrenchment substitutes straightforwardly for a formal one.o4
What theorists of subconstitutional entrenchment seem not to appreciate,
however, is that examples like this are the rule, not the exception. Statutes and
policies, as well as politicians and parties, can be entrenched just as readily by
functional, political mechanisms as by formal, legal ones.
Indeed, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have generated a
vast and varied literature exploring the many different means by which
political actors seek to insulate power holders and policies against downstream
political change without recourse to formal entrenchment devices. These
functional entrenchment strategies take a number of different forms. For
illustrative purposes, we focus on three of the most general.'o One is the
103. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1687.
104. In fact, upon closer inspection, a number of examples of legislative entrenchment featured in
the scholarly literature seem to involve functional without formal entrenchment. Theorists
who characterize the Gramm-Rudman Act and other framework statutes as impermissible
legislative entrenchment recognize that there is no legal impediment that prevents a
subsequent congressional majority from revising or repealing the original statute. To the
extent framework statutes entrench policies or procedures against change, they do so by
raising the political salience - and therefore, in some cases, the political cost - of reversal.
Gramm-Rudman, for example, was designed to impose "substantial political risks" on
subsequent congressional majorities that chose not to comply by forcing them to overcome
the burden of "legislative inertia" and "to act in the full glare of the balanced budget
debate." Kahn, supra note 67, at 2o5; see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework
Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 717, 748-53 (2005). The entrenchment of the
Senate filibuster may be similar, if the Senate rules are interpreted to permit a current
majority to lower the voting threshold for cloture. For that matter, if the remedy for breach
of government contracts is limited to damages -as the Court has strongly implied it must
be-then the only barrier to legal change is whatever political consequences flow from
paying that amount of money. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 885-87
(1996) (plurality opinion). At the extreme, one could argue that the costs of entrenchment
can always be boiled down to political costs, inasmuch as even a clear legal prohibition or a
judicial command could be ignored or overridden by political actors willing to suffer the
political consequences.
105. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Other methods and mechanisms of functional
political entrenchment might be identified, and the various methods might be taxonomized
in various ways. For example, Paul Pierson develops a set of mechanisms of political
stabilization and path dependence by analogy with the economic phenomenon of increasing
returns. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17-
53 (2004). Patterns of technology adoption, industrial location, and international trade have
been explained as emerging from a path-dependent process through which slight initial
advantages nowball into irreversible market dominance. Increasing returns are commonly
created by several features of the economic context: (1) large set-up or fixed costs, which
lead to lower marginal costs of producing additional units and create an incentive to stick
with the initial design; (2) learning effects, which increase the value of the product over
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enactment of substantive policies that have the effect of strengthening political
allies or weakening political opponents. A second, related strategy is to enact
policies or programs that have the effect of changing the composition of the
political community-selecting in allies or selecting out opponents. A third
strategy is to shift the locus of political decision making, empowering a
different governmental institution and consequently a different set of political
actors and groups.
In the Sections that follow, we illustrate these common mechanisms of
functional political entrenchment with a number of examples, some drawn
from existing work in the social sciences and others that we develop on our
own. Each of these examples involves a political strategy designed to
accomplish functionally what equivalent electoral or legislative entrenchment
strategies might have accomplished formally.
B. Money and Mobilization
The most straightforward strategy of political entrenchment is to
selectively empower one's allies or to selectively disempower one's enemies.
One way of accomplishing this, of course, is by manipulating the legal
frameworks governing elections and legislation. But another, and perhaps
more pervasive, way of achieving the same results is to engineer policy
initiatives that organize, mobilize, and enrich interest groups and other
constituencies with a stake in defending one's preferred policies and the
officials who enacted them, or that demobilize or drain the resources of interest
groups and constituencies on the other side. In E.E. Schattschneider's well-
known summation, "New policies create a new politics.",1o6 And new politics
time; and (3) coordination effects, including network externalities, which increase the value
of a product as more people use it and expect others to use it in the future. See generally W.
BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994). The
classic example is the QVERTY typewriter keyboard. See generally Paul A. David, Clio and
the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985). Pierson shows how each of these
features has political analogues. The design of political institutions and policy regimes often
entails high initial set-up costs. These institutions and regimes often inspire specific,
nontransferable investments by various political actors and increase the power of these
actors to block change. The benefits of coordinating around an existing set of institutions
and policies lends further stability to these arrangements by creating equilibria in which no
group can do better by withdrawing or contesting the status quo. See PIERSON, supra, at 22-
53, 142-57; see also Levinson, supra note 17, at 681-91 (elaborating on these and other
mechanisms of political stability and entrenchment).
106. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 288 (1935); see also THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY
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can be engineered in ways that entrench enacted policies or the parties or
politicians that created them, through political feedback effects.1 o7
The classic example to which we have been referring throughout is Social
Security, which created a vested interest group that was induced to rely on the
benefits of the program and strongly motivated to resist retrenchment. Prior to
the enactment of the Social Security Act, senior citizens in the United States
were neither a politically active nor particularly powerful constituency. But
Social Security galvanized seniors, providing them with a focused motivation
for defending their benefits and the material and organizational resources to
transform themselves into a formidable interest group. As a result, Social
Security became increasingly untouchable-the notorious "third rail" of
American politics.,os
Other examples of political feedback effects focus on entrenchment by way
of disempowering enemies. For example, scholars have documented how
airline deregulation reduced the economic and political cohesion of the
industry and therefore the political pressure that could be applied in favor of
recartelization.o' Similarly, international trade agreements and free-trade
policies tend to channel wealth and (consequently) political power away from
import-competing interests and toward export interests and therefore to erode
their own opposition while building their own support.'
Political actors may not always intend or anticipate these self-entrenching
political feedback effects. But it would be remarkable if political actors were not
attuned to the self-serving possibilities, and in at least some cases there is clear
evidence that entrenchment was not just an unintended byproduct but part of
the self-conscious design of particular programs and policies.
IN THE UNITED STATES 57-60 (1992) (describing how "[p]olicies [t]ransform [p]olitics").
Schattschneider was generalizing from the example of the tariff:
By means of the protective system governments stimulate the growth of
industries dependent on this legislation for their existence, and these industries
form the fighting legions behind the policy. The tariff likewise destroys interests.
The losers adapt themselves to the new conditions imposed upon them, find
themselves without the means to continue the struggle, or become discouraged
and go out of business. Is this not true, in varying degrees, of nearly all other
policies also? New polices create a new politics.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra, at 288.
107. See PIERSON, supra note 105, at 30.
108. See ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, How POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIvisM
AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2003); Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare
State, 48 WORLD POL. 143, 144-47 (1996).
iog. See, e.g., PATASHNIK, supra note 12, at 179-80.
no. See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 53-54 (2009).
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1. From Poll Taxes and White Primaries to Labor Law
The struggle for political power in the American South during the early and
middle decades of the twentieth century is oft-invoked as a seminal example of
electoral entrenchment. The Democratic Party during this period had a
monopoly on Southern politics, and the Party itself was ruled by a faction of
white conservatives. This ruling faction was able to maintain its grip on the
Party - and thus on Southern politics - only by disfranchising blacks and poor
whites."' To this end, Party leaders engineered the enactment of poll taxes and
prohibitions on black participation in primary elections."2
But poll taxes and the white primary were not the only tools of electoral
entrenchment. Labor law was another device used by conservative Democrats
to fend off threats to their dominance. Those threats came from unions.
Beginning in the late 1930s, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) -
the labor movement's progressive wing -sent teams of organizers to the South
in an attempt to realign the Democratic Party."' Union efforts began with
political education and so-called "citizenship classes" that covered the
procedures for voting, the importance of voting, and tools for organizing
communities to vote."4 The unions' political work also included voter
i%. Because blacks and poor whites almost always outnumbered white elites in any election
district, the Democrats' strategy was a tenuous one: if even a small proportion of blacks or
poor whites could be registered and enabled to vote, power within an individual district, or
across the Party as a whole, could be shifted. As Patricia Sullivan concludes, "The inordinate
power enjoyed by southern members of Congress was dependent on a small electorate
restricted by race and class." PAT1ICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN
THE NEw DEAL ERA 105 (1996).
m. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 652-68. After Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944), and the constitutional invalidation of the white primary, the poll tax became a
primary tool of black disfranchisement. As Steven Lawson writes, "Along with literacy tests
and registration requirements, the tax ... dramatically sliced voter turnout and discouraged
the organization of political-party opposition." STEVEN F. LAwsON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 55 (1976).
113. Between 1937 and 1939, for example, the CIO's Textile Workers Organizing Committee
spent two million dollars and had six hundred organizers in the field working on this
Southern strategy to "recast the Democratic Party." STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WuL RULE:
SIDNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 387 (1991). When, in 1943, the CIO
established its Political Action Committee (the CIO-PAC), it too focused on Southern
political organizing. CIO-PAC established regional offices in Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Texas,
Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. JOSEPH GAER, THE FIRST ROUND: THE STORY
OF THE CIO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 230 (1944).
114. See, e.g., Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor,
Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM. HIST. 786, 792-93 (1988).
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registration drives, conducted by both black and white fieldworkers and aimed
at both poor white and eligible black voters. 5 Perhaps most importantly,
unions developed campaigns to pay poll taxes on behalf of voters who could
not afford them." 6
The goal of these efforts was straightforward: to organize black and
working-class white voters and get them to the polls to "rid the Democratic
Party of conservatives."n7 The union efforts produced significant results. After
one successful poll tax campaign among oil workers in a Texas congressional
district-a campaign that led to registration rates "higher than ever known
before in the region" -the incumbent Democrat withdrew from his reelection
campaign."' In Huntsville, Alabama, where the CIO paid poll taxes for four
thousand workers in a population of approximately 13,500, the fiercely
conservative incumbent Joe Starnes was defeated."9
Conservative incumbents understood the political threat the union posed,
and "[t]hroughout the World War II era, Southern congressmen, newspapers,
and business leaders [railed against CIO] efforts to mobilize black voters and
poor whites."2 o Incumbents also understood that, just as poll taxes could
neutralize political opposition from blacks and poor whites, so too could
restrictive labor legislation. Thus, nearly as soon as CIO organizers arrived in
the South, Southern state legislatures became "hotbeds of antilabor
115. See SULUIVAN, supra note iii, at 173.
116. In 1943, for example, the CIO led a poll tax drive in Martin Dies's Texas congressional
district that resulted in a twenty-five to thirty percent increase in voter registration rates. In
1944, the director of the CIO-PAC's Southern region reported that seventy-five thousand
previously unregistered workers had registered and paid poll taxes in eight Southern states.
ROBERT A. GARSON, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE POLITICS OF SECTIONALISM, 1941-
1948, at 76 (1974).
117. GILBERT J. GALL, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT To WORK: THE LABOR FEDERATIONS AS SPECIAL
INTERESTS, 1943-1979, at 30 (1988).
118. MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, SIDNEY HILLMAN: STATESMAN OF AMERICAN LABOR 610-11 (1952).
ii9. GARSON, supra note 116, at 76; see also William H. Riker, The CIO in Politics 1936-1946, at
310-11 (1948) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with authors).
During those same 1944 primaries, incumbents in South Carolina, Missouri, Arkansas,
Alabama, and Texas "all lost to PAC-endorsed candidates." FRASER, supra note 113, at 514.
12o. ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO: 1935-1955, at 230-31 (1995). "The CIO-PAC, complained
North Carolina senator Josiah Bailey in 1944, 'will seek to purge us and every other self
respecting and honest man who runs for office."' Id. at 230. The CIO's organizing efforts
"scared the daylights" out of South Carolina Senator Ellison Durant "Cotton Ed" Smith,
BRYANT SIMON, A FABRIC OF DEFEAT: THE POLITICS OF SOUTH CAROLINA MILLHANDS, 1910-
1948, at 197 (1998), and, during the 1948 Texas Democratic primary, a segregationist
congressman received a report that "'Negroes outnumbering whites almost 3-1 were led by
CIO and AF of L leaders,' and this mutual cooperation forced the retreat of the Dixiecrats,"
LAWSON, supra note 112, at 127.
433
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
legislation."... After the CIO fiercely but unsuccessfully opposed the reelection
of Texas Governor Wilbert Lee O'Daniel, O'Daniel pushed for legislation that
outlawed much core union activity.'" Two years later, Texas passed the
Manford Act which prohibited unions from charging dues that would "create a
fund in excess of the reasonable requirements of such union" - in other words,
a fund that could be used for political activity.' For good measure, the Texas
Act also flatly forbade unions from making political contributions7" These
laws were replicated in states across the South.2 s
The Democratic push for restrictive labor laws was not confined to state
legislatures; Southern Democrats who were CIO targets also took their efforts
to Congress."' Thus, in 1943, Howard Smith of Virginia co-sponsored the War
Labor Disputes Act, a law that banned political contributions by unions.'
Several Southern Democrats who had been targeted by CIO organizing efforts
also used their positions on the House Un-American Activities Committee to
initiate investigations into the CIO's political activities.
Of course, restrictive labor laws served purposes beyond political
entrenchment. Union activity in the South threatened entrenched economic
interests as directly as it threatened entrenched political leaders. But the dual
purpose of the Southern Democratic approach to labor policy does not
diminish its self-interested political dynamic. As George Norris Green
described Texas Democratic politics during this era, the Party establishment
"not only feared the economic disadvantages of unionism for Dixie's
corporations, but also opposed Northern labor's encroachments in the high
councils of the Democratic Party.""'
The strategic use of labor law as a political entrenchment mechanism
became well established in American politics, with lasting effects on both labor
law and political power. Perhaps the broadest and most powerful legislative
121. SULLIvAN, supra note iii, at 188.
122. Murray Emanual Polakoff, The Development of the Texas State CIO Council 47 (1955)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
123. 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 180.
124. See Labor Laws and Court Decisions, 56 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 941, 942 (1943).
125. HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT To TAFT-HARTLEY 323
(1950).
126. See TRACY RooF, AMERICAN LABOR, CONGRESS, AND THE WELFARE STATE 1935-2010, at 28-
30 (2011); SuLLIvAN, supra note 111, at 174.
127. MIILIS & BROWN, supra note 125, at 346.
128. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 118, at 6o8-io.
129. GEORGE NORRIS GREEN, THE ESTABLISHMENT IN TEXAS POLITICS: THE PRIMITIVE YEARS,
1938-1957, at 61 (1979).
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attack on union political activity came in 1947 when a coalition of Southern
Democrats and Northern Republicans, led by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio,
passed the Taft-Hartley Act. That statute imposed a wide range of new
restrictions on unions, including major restrictions on union political activity
and a complete federal ban on closed-shop agreements- thereby invalidating
what had been the unions' primary funding mechanism.3 o Southern
Democrats in Congress were nearly unanimous in their support for Taft-
Hartley.'' O'Daniel, the Texas Governor who had fought the CIO in state
politics, was now a U.S. Senator and was particularly open about the political
importance of the Act. As he stated on the Senate floor:
When Senators are talking about the closed shop, they are talking about
the very heart and soul of the control of our American form of
government, because it is the closed shop which siphons off from the
taxpayers and the honest laboring people of the country, hundreds of
millions of dollars. This is done for the specific purpose of defeating the
reelection of any Member of Congress who opposes the labor-leader
racketeers, and for the political purposes of using this money that is
gained by virtue of the closed shop to elect to the Senate and to the
House of Representatives men who will do the bidding of the labor
leader racketeers.... The situation is a political one."'
130. See generally Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in
the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 16-17 (2005).
131. The political entrenchment function of the Taft-Hartley Act was also an important
motivation for Senator Taft. Going into his 1944 reelection campaign, Taft believed that his
position was secure, but the campaign became bitterly contested - and closely fought - when
the CIO-PAC entered the race and gave its support to Taft's opponent. See JAMES T.
PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 278 (1972). After the
election, Taft placed the blame for his near loss on the CIO, and in particular on its effort to
mobilize "labor and the Negroes." Letter from Robert A. Taft to David S. Ingalls (Nov. 10,
1944), in 2 THE PAPERS OF ROBERT A. TAFT, 1939-44, at 609, 609 (Clarence E. Wunderlin,
Jr. ed., 2001). As Taft's biographer tells it, the 1944 campaign "left [Taft] grimly resolved to
curb the power of organized labor in the future." PATTERSON, supra, at 278. Returning to the
Senate, Taft thus agreed to chair the Labor Committee -instead of the more prestigious
Finance Committee, which he had originally favored-in order to pass the antilabor
legislation that ultimately become the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. at 337-39.
132. 93 CONG. REC. 4,888-89 (1947) (statement of Sen. O'Daniel). Another example comes from
Wisconsin in the 1950s. After labor unions mounted a substantial political challenge to the
incumbent Republican governor-providing fifty-five percent of the Democratic
challenger's campaign contributions -Wisconsin Republicans took notice and introduced a
bill to "ban ... any political activity whatsoever by unions or their officers." Catlin Bill Is
Signed; Kohler Praises Law, MILWAUKEE J., May 21, 1955, at i. As enacted, the Catlin Act
"severely reduced labor's contribution to candidates of its choice and deprived the
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Labor law continues to serve this electoral entrenchment function in
contemporary politics. As we noted at the outset, because unions are critical
institutional supporters of the contemporary Democratic Party, undermining
the efficacy of labor unions is a well-understood means by which incumbent
Republican leaders can increase their reelection prospects."' Recall the recent
effort by Wisconsin Republicans to suppress opposition by amending the
state's labor laws to restrict the collective bargaining rights of public employees
and to prohibit public unions from collecting dues through payroll
deductions." Acting on the same motivation, Republican-dominated states
struggling Democrats of a major source of revenue." ROBERT W. OZANNE, THE LABOR
MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN: A HISTORY 147 (2011). Democrats at the time recognized the
intent and potential effect of the law, arguing that it was "intended to cripple the
Democratic Party and fasten one party rule on the state." Catlin Bill Is Signed, supra, at 7.
The bill's sponsor did not disagree, "hail[ing] the passage of his act as a high water mark for
the Republican Party: [t] he power of labor unions to influence elections with money from
their treasuries was over." William R. Bechtel & Kenneth Fry, Catlin Act Vote Shows Big State
Politics Shift, MILWAUKEEJ., May 4, 1959, at 5.
133. As J. David Greenstone famously observed, unions have been the "nationwide electoral
organization of the national Democratic Parry." J. DAVID GREENSTONE, LABOR IN AMERIcAN
POLITICS Xiii (i969). While the relative strength of unions has declined in recent years, their
position as a central force in Democratic politics remains stable. In the 2012 election cycle,
for example, unions contributed one hundred forty-three million dollars to parties and
candidates; ninety-one percent went to Democrats. In the 2010 cycle, of the top five highest-
spending nonparty organizations, the only organization that supported Democratic
candidates was a labor union. See 2010 Outside Spending, By Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
PoLITICS, at xiii, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php [http://perma.cc
/9VY3-N6LW]; see also Hendrik Hertzberg, Union Blues, NEW YORKER (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2o1/o3/o7/11o3o7taco-talkhertzberg [http://
perma.cc/9CJ7-9EGL]. And union efforts continue to impact election results: in the 20o8
presidential elections, union membership increased by twelve percentage points the
likelihood that a voter would vote for Barack Obama, and unions boosted Obama's overall
national vote share by more than a full point. Nate Silver, The Effects of Union Membership
on Democratic Voting, N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 26, 2011, 7:oo AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2oll/o2/26/the-effects-of-union-membership-on
-democratic-voting [http://perma.cc/7NGF-C3XC]. In state and local races, the union effect
can be even more pronounced.
134. The effect of these restrictions on public sector unions' ability to operate either as economic
or political actors has been profound: union representation among Wisconsin's public
employees dropped from 53.4% to 37.6% in the two years following the legislation's
enactment. See Amanda Becker, U.S. Union Membership Steady at 11.3 Percent in 2013: Labor
Department, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ol/24/us-usa
-labor-membership-idUSBREAoNMQ20140124 [http://perma.cc/H9MG-CJAD].
Following Wisconsin's lead, the Republican-controlled Ohio Legislature enacted a
similar law in 2011. See S. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). Indiana and
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across the country have begun to enact so-called paycheck protection bills that
prohibit traditional methods of union dues collection.' Commenting on these
developments, Steve Fraser and Joshua Freeman have observed: "[W]hat we
are seeing is a partisan strategy to defund the Democratic Party, which has
received massive amounts of money from the union movement in recent years,
especially from public sector unions.",, 6
The discussion so far highlights the ways that incumbents can use
substantive policy to neutralize political opposition, in much the same way that
poll taxes and primary rules were used to neutralize opposition. But policy can
just as easily be used to selectively mobilize political support. From an electoral
entrenchment perspective, these are interchangeable tactics: both are ways of
using the power of incumbency to shift the rules of the political game in
incumbents' favor.
Thus, while in recent decades Republicans have sought to use their offices
to undermine union strength in order to neutralize Democratic opposition,
Democratic officeholders have just as aggressively sought to bolster unions in
order to shore up their own electoral prospects. At the federal level, for
example, Congress recently debated the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), a
bill that would have made private-sector unionization substantially easier."'
Nearly the entire Democratic caucus in both the House and Senate supported
the bill.,,8 While there were legitimate labor-policy reasons to support EFCA,
Democrats could not have missed the possibility that increasing unionization
rates and the political power of organized labor would improve their electoral
prospects. Critics certainly highlighted this feature of the proposed legislation.
Writing in Labor Watch, W. James Antle put it this way:
[T]he Democrats and the labor unions have a symbiotic
relationship . . . . The unions help the Democrats gain power, through
Michigan passed right-to-work statutes in 2012. See IND. CODE. § 22-6-6-8 (2012); 2012
Mich. Pub. Acts 348 (private sector); 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 349 (public sector).
135. See, e.g., Gordon Lafer, The 'Paycheck Protection' Racket, EcON. POL'Y INST. (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://s4 .epi.org/files/2013/paycheck-protection-racket-tilting-political.pdf [http://perma.cc
/Q 325-XQY5].
136. Steve Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman, In the Rearview Mirror: A Brief Histoty of Opposition to
Public Sector Unionism, 20 NEw LAB. F. 93, 96 (2011).
137. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules
of Union Organizing, 123 HARY. L. REv. 655, 664-72 (2010).
138. Though not the entire caucus. For example, at least two Democratic senators from states
with very low union density -Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas and Ben Nelson of Nebraska -
did not support EFCA. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Fierce Lobbying Greets Bill To Help
Workers Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. lo, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o3/11
/business/iilabor.html [http://perma.cc/F6KR-L8G9].
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their volunteers and their financial contributions. The Democrats
return the favor by enhancing the unions' clout and trying to reverse
their membership's decline. This in turn means more dues with which
to help elect Democrats. The cycle continues . . . ."9
Likewise, at the state level, while Republicans in Ohio and Wisconsin have
moved to dismantle public sector unions, Democratic governors and
legislatures in states like Illinois, California, Oregon, and Iowa have moved to
expand union rights to new groups of public employees.140 These newly
unionized workers will undoubtedly provide a valuable source of
organizational and financial support for the Democratic governors and
legislators who enabled their organization. Commenting critically on one such
law, George Will put the point this way: "[T]he purpose of such systems is to
enable unions to siphon away, in dues, a portion of [employees'] pay, some of
which becomes campaign contributions for the political party that created the
system.""' As Will and others have recognized, labor law affects political
power and is a potentially powerful mechanism of political entrenchment.
2. From Campaign Finance Reform to Tort Reform
In election law scholarship and Supreme Court case law, campaign finance
reform is widely suspected of being another mechanism of incumbent and
partisan entrenchment. But formal campaign finance rules are not the only way
that incumbents and temporarily dominant parties can shore up their financial
advantage. Substantive policymaking can also be used to tilt the campaign-
finance playing field. A clear contemporary example is tort reform. Trial
lawyers provide a significant portion of the funds relied on by Democratic
139. W. James Antle III, A Piece of the Action: Labor Expects Much from the Next Congress, New
Administration, CAP. RES. CTR. 5 (Dec. 2008), http://capitalresearch.org/wp-content
/uploads/2o13/o7/LW12o8.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FPM-ANHY].
140. For Ohio and Wisconsin, see Becker, supra note 134. For Illinois, California, Oregon, and
Iowa, see generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 382-
87 (2007).
141. George Will, Siphoning Compensation from Caregivers to Unions for Political Contributions,
MISSOULIAN (Jan. 21, 2014), http://missoulian.com/news/opinion/columnists/syndicated
/george-will-siphoning-compensation-from-caregivers-to-unions-for-political/article 
4a57c
a2a-82a2-nle3-b2dd-ool9bb2963f4.html [http://perma.cc/2TVC-HMUB]. Will's critique is
not precisely accurate. Union dues cannot be used for political "contributions" to
candidates, but they can be used to fund independent expenditures made on behalf of
candidates, so long as the dues-paying union member does not object to such use. See
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United,
112 COLUM. L. REv. 8oo, 809-19 (2012).
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candidates in both state and federal elections."' Trial lawyers, in turn, rely on
jury awards to generate the income they channel to Democratic candidates.'43
Consequently, legal reforms that reduce jury awards are an effective
mechanism for staunching the flow of funds to Democrats-and thus an
attractive entrenchment device for Republicans.
This calculus contributed to the emergence of tort reform as a central plank
in the Republican Party's platform starting in the 199os.'4 To be sure,
Republicans supported tort reform for reasons other than partisan political
advantage; tort reform is a policy goal embraced on the merits by many interest
groups (and voters)."s But it is impossible to miss the fact that a significant
part of the attraction of tort reform for Republicans was the potential for
defunding their Democratic opponents.
Certainly Karl Rove did not miss it. In his early years as a Texas political
consultant, Rove presciently anticipated the political potential of tort reform.
Beginning in the late 198os and continuing into the 1990s, Rove worked to
elect Republican justices to the Texas Supreme Court with an eye toward
reducing the size and frequency of jury awards. 6 When George W. Bush
became Governor, Rove also pushed for significant legislative tort reform.47 As
one of Rove's longtime journalistic observers recounted, Rove decided to "run
with tort reform" in part because he thought the issue would play well with the
Texas electorate, but also because he understood tort reform's partisan
potential:
142. See Sachs, supra note 141.
143. See, e.g., Timothy P. Carney, Trial Lawyer Industry Tries To Buy a Democratic
Majority, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trial
-lawyer-industry-tries-to-buy-a-democratic-majority/article/2555105 [http://perma.cc/9RK5
-3WKS]. This phenomenon is nothing new. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Trial Lawyers
Pour Money into Democrats' Chests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2000), http://www.nytimes
.com/2000/03/23/us/trial-lawyers-pour-money-into-democrats-chests.html [http://perma
.cc/K4NB-8CAT].
144. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 143.
145. See The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 2-3 (June
2004), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/lo8th-congress-2003-2004/reports/report_2
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RB-PRNF] (presenting arguments for and against tort reform on
the merits).
146. See, e.g., S.C. Gwynne, Genius, TEX. MONTHLY (Mar. 2003), http://www.texasmonthly
.com/story/genius [http://perma.cc/8SVB-DRAN]; Frontline, Karl Rove-the Architect:
Interview: Sam Gwynne, PBS (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/architect/interviews/gwynne.html [http://perma.cc/GSL2-88W5] [hereinafter
Frontline, Guynne].
147. Mimi Swartz, Left Behind, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 2011), http://www.texasmonthly.com
/story/left-behind [http://perma.cc/3XGN-8RDD].
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[I]t happened in the '8os that the major financing of the Democratic
Party in Texas ... began to be done by trial lawyers. If you looked at
the biggest givers to the Texas Democratic Party in the '8os and the
'90s, you would see at the top of that list trial lawyers. So [tort reform]
became this giant pitched battle, because it wasn't just necessarily about
the kind of verdicts and the ease with which someone might get a
verdict for a plaintiff, but it was also about the back end, which was the
financing of the entire Democratic Party.
... It's a battle for the soul of Texas politics because it's a battle for the
money, the lifeline money of Democrats . . . .
Following Rove's successful use of the strategy in Texas, the Republican
Party adopted tort reform as a national cause. In 1994, Newt Gingrich included
in his Contract with America a proposed bill called the Common Sense Legal
Reform Act,49 which would have preempted much of state tort law and
imposed a federal punitive damages cap of two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars in products liability cases.so The next year, the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives enacted major restrictions on medical malpractice
awards.s1
Although elected leaders refrained from speaking openly about the political
implications of tort reform, Republican activists were less circumspect."s2 In
1994, for example, Grover Norquist published a prominent essay arguing the
merits of reform.'s Emphasizing trial lawyers' importance to the Democratic
Party, Norquist asserted that "[t]he political implications of de-funding the
trial lawyers would be staggering."'54 By 1999, with the presidential election of
2000 looming, Norquist reiterated his case, arguing that even "[m]odest tort
148. Frontline, Gwynne, supra note 146.
149. Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar
Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 674 (1996).
iso. Id. at 675.
151. Id. at 68o.
is2. See generally STEPHANIE MENCIMER, BLOCKING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY AND ITS CORPORATE ALLIES ARE TAKING AWAY YOUR RIGHT To SUE 97
(2006) ("Republican activists began to talk openly about attacking lawyers because of their
pivotal role in funding Democratic politics.").
153. Grover G. Norquist, A Winning Drive, AM. SPECTATOR (Va.), Mar. 1994, at 60. The essay
discusses the political benefits to Republicans of defunding the trial lawyers in the context
of a reform bill that would have enabled individuals to waive the right to sue for pain-and-
suffering damages in order to secure reduced automobile insurance premiums.
154. Id. at 61.
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reform .. . would break the trial lawyers, second only to the unions as a source
of funds for the left."1 5 5
Here again, the same policy that neutralizes political opposition can also
mobilize political support. Tort reform seems to have played this dual role for
the Republicans in the 1990s and 2000s: not only did it impede the ability of
trial lawyers to finance Democratic candidates, it also protected Republican
business constituencies from high-dollar tort judgments and thus incentivized
(and better enabled) this constituency to act as funders for the Republican
Party. As John Podesta, White House Chief of Staff under Bill Clinton, told the
Washington Post: "Why would you make [tort reform] the cause c6ldbre? ...
It's important to them in both directions, both in organizing core elements of
their business and doctor communities, and at least undermining a financial
base of the Democratic Party. ,,i6
C. Shaping the Political Community
Another well-documented entrenchment technique is for incumbent
leaders to use the power of their offices to shape their own polities in such a
way as to ensure their lasting support. Election law scholars have been attentive
to this possibility in the context of districting, which presents politicians with
155. Grover G. Norquist, Winner Takes All: The 2ooo Elections Will Decide the Democrats' Future,
AM. SPECTATOR (Va.), Apr. 1999, at 66, 67. In addition to trial lawyers, Norquist named
"labor unions" and "Big City machines" as the other two pillars of the Democratic Party. Id.
at 66. Following the election of President Bush, the Republican leadership did indeed move
to enact a series of tort reform measures. Again, neither Bush nor any administration
officials spoke of the reforms as mechanisms of entrenchment. But others did: for example,
Washington Post reporter Thomas B. Edsall wrote of the GOP's tort reform efforts that
"[t]he drive to limit court-awarded damages in civil lawsuits ... is usually framed as a
contest between accident victims' rights and reasonable constraints on corporate behavior.
Increasingly, however, the battle is deeply partisan, as conservative groups try to
mobilize the political right and cripple a key Democratic constituency, trial lawyers."
Thomas B. Edsall, Battle over Damage Awards Takes a More Partisan Turn, WASH.
POsT (Aug. 1o, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2oo3/o8/o/battle
-over-damage-awards-takes-a-more-partisan-turn/ade8d300-94oe-4e4a-86ba-dao2c437e9e5
[http://perma.cc/M96P-MEX8].
156. Thomas B. Edsall & John F. Harris, Bush Aims To Forge a GOP Legacy: Second-Term
Plans Look To Undercut Democratic Pillars, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyVarticles/A47559-2oo5Jan29.html [http://perma
.cc/W7CN-HW27]. Similarly, Ed Lazarus, a Democratic strategist, described tort reform as
a "double header" because it worked both to "defund the Democratic Party" -by choking off
tort damage awards-and to provide increased support to the Republicans by motivating
donations by those industries negatively impacted by tort awards, including the
pharmaceutical industry. Edsall, supra note iss.
441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the valuable opportunity to choose their voters. But here again, there are
functional substitutes to gerrymandered districts. Substantive programs and
policies can also be used to reshape politics in self-reinforcing ways by
increasing the number of proponents relative to opponents. For example,
municipal gun control or antismoking ordinances will predictably gain political
support over time as gun owners and smokers either give up their firearms and
cigarettes or exit the jurisdiction, either way resulting in a higher percentage of
unarmed and nonsmoking supporters of the relevant policy and the officials
who promulgated it.' 7 Laws permitting more immigration or providing for the
better treatment of immigrants will be similarly self-reinforcing, as a greater
number of immigrants exercise more political power for the benefits of their
successors.1ss
Although some selection effects along these lines will be unintentional,
strategic politicians have every incentive to manipulate policy for the purpose
of shaping their electorates and entrenching their hold on power. A famous
example is the "Curley Effect," described by Edward Glaeser and Andrei
Shleifer.'59 James Michael Curley, who served four terms as the mayor of
Boston during the first half of the twentieth century, was supported by a
political base of lower-income Irish residents but opposed by Boston's
wealthier Anglo-Saxon voters. To increase his own electoral prospects, Curley
was interested in keeping poor Irish in the city and in encouraging the wealthy
Anglo-Saxons to leave. With no formal immigration law at his disposal, Curley
instead used his control over public projects, patronage, zoning laws, and the
like to make things as hospitable as possible in Boston for his own voters and
as uncomfortable as possible for his opponents."6
Selecting a supportive constituency ensured these leaders' political survival
and thus the continuation of their broader policy agendas.161 In the remainder
157. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1116-18
(2003). Given Tiebout sorting dynamics, these examples can be generalized to different
kinds of policy decisions, especially at he municipal level where exit is less costly.
158. See id. at 118-19.
159. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the
Electorate, 21 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1 (2005).
16o. See id. at 10-12.
161. Less strategic politicians may be victimized by political selection effects running in the
opposite direction. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Gentrification Changing Face of New Atlanta,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2006), http://www.nytimes.con/2006/o3/11/national/iiatlanta.html
[http://perma.cc/2ZZM-63CV] (quoting a community leader as saying that African
American mayors have "cut [their] own throat[s]" by encouraging gentrification that has
decreased the percentage of black voters in the city). Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
generalize this threat to many historical and political contexts to explain why power holders
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of this Section we consider two additional cases in which parties and politicians
have quite clearly and self-consciously pursued entrenchment through the
selection of a favorable electorate. The first example is the admission of new
states in a federal system. Because each such admission threatens to shift the
balance of overall federal power, those decisions are made with an eye to
maintaining control by the currently dominant federal party. The second
example is immigration policy, through which incumbents literally define their
own polities.
1. From Gerrymandering to State Admissions
In a federal system, the admission of new states can shift the balance of
national power in the direction favored by the representatives of the newly
admitted state. Consequently, current legislative majorities can cement their
hold on power by selectively admitting, or not admitting, new states. As we
will show, this dynamic, just like gerrymandering, can be bipartisan or
partisan. In the bipartisan form, legislatures lock in a policy status quo by
designing state admissions policy in a way that maintains the current balance
of partisan power. In the partisan form, a dominant party advances its own
policy agenda and insulates that agenda against subsequent change by
manipulating the admissions policy.
The antebellum period provides a clear instance of bipartisan agreement on
state admissions for the purpose of maintaining the policy status quo. In the
antebellum era, the relevant policy was slavery, and disputes over state
admissions were primarily proxy fights in the sectional battle over slavery."'
During much of this period, there was an equal balance of power between
Northern and Southern states in the Senate, which enabled either section to
block policies they opposed.6 3 But the balance of power meant that each state
often oppose economic development, out of fear that the resulting shifts in economic and
political power will lead to their downfall. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note i, at 83-
91.
162. See, e.g., DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 33 (1976); see also Nolan
McCarty et al., Congress and the Territorial Expansion of the United States, in PARTY, PROCESS,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS
392, 398 (David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2002) ("The admission of new
states during the antebellum period was tied to the conflict over slavery . . . ."). See generally
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 152-87 (1978) (describing the events leading up to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1954).
163. See Barry R. Weingast, Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and
American Democracy, in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 148, 151 (Robert H. Bates et al. eds., 1998).
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admission could shift political control of the Senate, and thus control over
national policymaking, to one region or the other.
With the Senate evenly divided, neither North nor South could dominate
admissions politics, but each side could ensure the continuation of the status
quo. The result was a series of political compromises in which slave and free
states were admitted in pairs. Thus, at the time of the debate over the
admission of Missouri as a slave state in 1819, there were eleven northern states
and eleven southern states in the Union. 6 , Missouri's admission, therefore,
created the possibility that slave states would predominate over free ones. 6s To
prevent this political shift and the policy consequences it would threaten,
Northerners in Congress insisted that Maine enter the Union as a free state as a
concession for their allowing Missouri to enter as a slave state.6 6 The Missouri
Compromise established a pattern that Congress would follow for some time,
with slave and free states entering together, to preserve the Senate's sectional
balance.6' This so-called balance rule "protected Northerners against the
dominance of national policymaking by the South, and it protected
Southerners against the antislavery initiatives of the North."'6 8 In other words,
it enabled Congress - in a bipartisan and bisectional manner - to lock in the
national status quo on the slavery question.
But sectional balance in the Senate did not survive. By the early 186os,
Republicans had control of Congress, and the party was then able to use state
admissions policy to enact its national agenda and insulate that agenda against
subsequent reversal by Democrats. The admission of Nevada in 1864 provides
one early and stark example of this strategy. When the state was admitted in
1864, Nevada's population was approximately forty thousand, and its economy
was undeveloped.169 Thus, Nevada's admission was "the most egregious effort
in the nation's history to disregard population and economic criteria in order to
164. See THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS ENCYCLOPEDIA 123 (Julius E. Thompson et al. eds., 2010); H.
Jason Combs, Slavery in the Platte Region, 15 NEB. ANTHROPOLOGIST 8, 9 (1999).
165. POTTER, supra note 162, at 53.
166. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 162, at 107.
167. Weingast, supra note 163, at 154 tbl.4.1. The pattern predates the Missouri Compromise, and
may indeed date back to the Founding and the admission of Vermont as a counterbalance to
Kentucky.
168. See id. at 151.
169. See generally RUSSELL R. ELLIOTT, HISTORY OF NEVADA 70-71, 99 (1973). Nearly a century
before Nevada was admitted, "[w]hen the Northwest Territories were divided into states,
Congress required a population of 6o,ooo for each territory to be admitted." Lawrence M.
Frankel, Comment, National Representation for the District of Columbia: A Legislative Solution,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1678 (1991) (citing Northwest Ordinance of 1787, § 14, art. VI, ch. 8,
1 Stat. So, 51 n.(a)).
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admit a state for political reasons."' Those political reasons were clear:
Nevada may well have been admitted "to bolster Republican numbers in the
Senate" and to "provide votes for the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
[and] Lincoln's reelection in 1864.""' The State did both."'
Across the 186os and 1870s, Republicans continued to admit Republican
states to the Union, enabling the party to lock up control of the Senate and
thereby enact-and entrench-its favored policies." Summarizing the
Republican Party's approach to state admission policies across the period,
Charles Stewart and Barry Weingast write:
Republican political hegemony in the 186os allowed them a head start
in the race to admit new states. During the secession crisis,
congressional Republicans took advantage of the withdrawal of
southern members to admit Kansas as a free, and Republican, state.
Over the objections of the few remaining Democrats, Congress
accepted the Unionist government in Wheeling as the legitimate
government of Virginia, accepted its vote consenting to the partition of
Virginia, and admitted West Virginia as a new state. While denying
admission to the more populous (but Democratic) Utah, Congress
voted to admit (Republican) Nevada when its population was only one
fifth that of the next-smallest state and one seventh that of Utah. By the
time the South fully returned to Congress . . . one sixth of the
Republican delegation in the Senate came from states admitted during
the Civil War and Reconstruction, and three of these four states ...
provided a nearly solid core of Republican voting strength in the Senate
for the rest of the century.74
170. Charles Stewart III & Barry R. Weingast, Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation:
Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development, 6 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 223, 232 (1992).
171. Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States
Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 141 & n.76 (2004); see also ELUOir, supra note
169, at 83-84; LESLIE BURNs GRAY, THE SOURCE AND THE VISION: NEVADA'S ROLE IN THE
ClVIL WAR AMENDMENTS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION LEGISLATION 31,45 (1990); GILMAN M.
OSTRANDER, NEVADA: THE GREAT ROTTEN BOROUGH 1859-1934, at 35 (1966).
172. See Stewart & Weingast, supra note 170, at 236 ("Nevada regularly sent Republicans to
Congress, in both chambers, for the next thirty years. It dutifully provided three additional
electoral votes for Lincoln in 1864, ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, and continued to
vote Republican until 1876.").
173. See id. at 246, 270.
174. Id. at 227 (footnote omitted).
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More contemporary state admissions debates also reflect these
entrenchment dynamics. When Alaska and Hawaii's admissions were being
debated in 1953, Republican congressional majorities opposed statehood for
Alaska because it was a historically Democratic territory; they supported
Hawaii's admission because of that territory's more conservative political
constituency.17' Likewise, in the ongoing debate over statehood for the District
of Columbia, Republicans oppose admission and Democrats support it because
of the predictable partisan impact that D.C. statehood would have on the
congressional balance of power.176
2. From Suffrage Restrictions to Immigration
Immigration policy is another obvious lever for expanding or restricting the
scope of the political community. Unsurprisingly, it too has been used
throughout American history as a mechanism of entrenchment.'" In 1798, for
example, Congress increased the number of years an immigrant had to be
present in the United States before naturalization from five to fourteen and
thus significantly delayed the enfranchisement of newly arrived American
residents.'78 Although there were likely a range of motivations for these
policies, Adam Cox and Eric Posner argue that this delay was orchestrated by
the Federalist Party in part as a means of preventing immigrants from
installing Jeffersonians in power.179 Daniel Tichenor similarly describes it as
"an effort by the Federalist party to forestall its imminent loss of political
power.",so When, in the elections of 18oo, the Federalists did lose their hold on
national political power, the Democratic-Republicans who took control of the
federal government changed the residency requirement back to five years.'8
The political consequences of these shifts in immigration law were not lost on
175. See Jonathan S. Ross, Note, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska Once Again
Consider a Unicameral Legislature?, 27 AIASKAL. REV. 257, 262-63 (2010).
176. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality ofD.C. Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
160, 161-62 (1991).
177. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights ofMigrants: An Optimal Contract Framework,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1447 (2009).
178. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 56, 1 Star. 566 (repealed 1802). The five-year residence period
had been established by the Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, which was
repealed in 1802.
179. Cox & Posner, supra note 177, at 1448.
i8o. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA
54 (2oo2).
181. See Naturalization Act of 1802, ch.28, 2 Stat. 153.
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contemporary observers. Tichenor recounts how "Federalist newspapers like
the Columbia Sentinel featured naturalization policy in an extended series
exploring how Jeffersonians translated proimmigrant policies into foreign-
born votes.",,8,
In the 18oos, Democrats continued to push for liberal immigration and
naturalization policies, in part because of their predictable electoral effects. At
the local level, "Democratic organizations worked hard to enfranchise white
male newcomers as swiftly as possible," and, in 1845, a congressional
investigation found that "urban Democratic political machines were well
practiced at naturalizing thousands of immigrants just before elections."8 3
That political dynamic continues to prevail in contemporary politics, with
the Republican Party pushing to delay the naturalization of immigrants
currently residing in the United States, and the Democratic Party attempting to
ensure that naturalization. Thus, under President Clinton, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service launched a program called Citizenship USA, which
aimed to speed up naturalization.'* Republicans at the time viewed
Citizenship USA as an attempt to increase the number of Democratic voters,
and charged that a top aide to Vice President Gore had called the program a
"pro-Democratic voter mill."""s
Similarly, the immigration bill passed by the Democratic-controlled Senate
in June 2013 contained a path to citizenship for the eleven million
undocumented immigrants currently living in the country.'8 6 This population
consists primarily of low-income Hispanics, who vote by great margins for
Democratic candidates .8' The undocumented population, if naturalized,
would also constitute a significant percentage of the electorate in several states
crucial to presidential politics: by 2020, formerly undocumented immigrants
are projected to make up 7.1% of the electorate in Texas, 6.7% in Arizona, 7.8%
182. TICHENOR, supra note 18o, at 55.
183. Id. at 59.




186. S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
187. See Mark Hugo Lopez & Paul Taylor, Latino Voters in the 2012 Election, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov.
7, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/1/o7Aatino-voters-in-the-2012-election [http://
perma.cc/S9KQ-BAKY]; Jeffrey S. Passell & D'Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized
Immigrants in the United States, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic
.org/2009/o4/14/a-portrait-of-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states [http://perma
.cc/Z4JX-8F82]; A Nation of Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www
.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nation-of-immigrants [http://perma.cc/DRK2-7NUS].
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in Nevada, 4.9% in Florida and Georgia, and between 2% and 4% in Colorado,
Virginia, and North Carolina.'88
While Democrats supported citizenship for these undocumented residents,
Republicans in the Senate not only opposed the path to citizenship, but also
offered amendments that would have lengthened the time to naturalization and
made the requirements for naturalization more onerous than they are today.189
Republican commentators are not shy about defending this decision on
electoral grounds. Thus, Laura Ingraham argued in a Washington Post opinion
piece that the GOP should continue to oppose immigration reform: "In light of
. . . the experience of California-which has shifted from a Republican
stronghold to one of the most liberal states in the country, in large part because
of the rise of its immigrant population-it is absurd to pretend that allowing
even more immigrant voters wouldn't be a boon to the Democrats."'9 o
Similarly, Rush Limbaugh called immigration reform "Republican suicide."
D. Switching Decision Makers
The previous two entrenchment strategies operate by shifting the relative
power of groups with a say in the political decision-making process. A further
strategy is to shift the locus of political decision making, empowering a
different set of political actors and groups. For example, the delegation of
authority to independent central banks is often viewed as a mechanism for
resisting political demands by short-sighted politicians and popular majorities
for inflationary and otherwise misguided monetary policies.'92 Central banks
that can be successfully insulated from these political pressures enable
188. Walter Hickey, How a Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants Would Influence the
Presidential Election of2o2o, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com
/impact-of-a-path-to-citizenship-on-2020-election-2013-3 [http://perma.cc/6U9-5HGZ].
18g. See, for example, Senator Jeff Sessions's amendments in committee markup and on the
floor. For a full summary of amendments considered during committee markup, see S. REP.
No. 113-40 passim (2013), http://www.congress.gov/13/crpt/srpt4o/CRPT-I13srpt4o.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5RK8-RYGP].
190. Laura Ingraham, Opinion, Why Conservatives Should Say No to Immigration Reform, WASH.




191. The Amnesty Bill Is GOP Suicide, RusH LIMBAUGH SHOW (Apr. 26, 2013), http://
www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2013/o4/26/the-amnesty-bill-is-gop-suicide [http://perma
.cc/KQ29-VR9K].
192. See ALAN DRAZEN, PoLTIcAL ECONOMY IN MACROECONOMICS 144 (2000); Kenneth Rogoff,
The Optimal Degree of Commitment o an Intermediate Monetary Target, ioo QJ.. ECoN. n69
(1985).
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governments to entrench sound monetary policies. Independent central banks
may also enable "political leaders [to] bind the hands of their successors in the
formation of monetary policy," locking in their preferred policies even after
they have been voted out of power.'
As this example illustrates, relocating decision-making authority to
institutional actors that are relatively insulated from political forces can shield
policies from change. Variations on this strategy, discussed below, include
delegations to courts, administrative agencies, and international governance
bodies. To the extent these institutions are likely to be controlled by political
allies of the delegator, and to the extent the delegation will be relatively
difficult to retract, 94  this can be an effective mechanism of policy
entrenchment.
1. From Legislative Entrenchment to Judicial Entrenchment
Social scientists and legal scholars alike have recognized that politicians can
entrench their policies and protect their hold on power by delegating decision-
making authority to a politically insulated judiciary. Thus, working within a
public choice paradigm, William Landes and Richard Posner famously argued
that an independent judiciary was a useful tool for legislators who wanted to
deliver statutory benefits for interest groups in exchange for campaign
contributions and political support. By enforcing the initial bargains against
downstream legislatures with political incentives to renege, Landes and Posner
argued, courts could increase the durability-and thus the value-of these
interest group bargains.919
In the United States, since the early days of the Republic, presidents and
parties often have resorted to a similar strategy of "political entrenchment in
the judiciary" to preserve their preferred policies in the face of political defeat.
Having lost control of the national government to the Republicans in the
election of 18oo, the lame-duck Federalist Congress famously passed the 18o
Judiciary Act, the so-called "Midnight Judges Act," expanding the size and
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary and creating the opportunity for President
Adams to appoint a number of loyal Federalists to life terms on the bench.
Furious that the Federalists had packed the judiciary on their way out of office,
newly elected President Jefferson clearly understood the political strategy in
193. John B. Goodman, The Politics ofCentral Bank Independence, 23 COMP. POL. 329, 334 (1991).
194. This condition is crucial, yet often overlooked. See Levinson, supra note 17, at 681-83.
195. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975).
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play: "[The Federalists] have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold . .. and
from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and
erased. "96
This strategy was executed more effectively by Republicans in the late
nineteenth century. As they perceived the electoral tide beginning to turn
against them, the Republican Party sought to lock in their agenda of
conservative "economic nationalism" by expanding the jurisdiction of the
federal courts and staffing them with ideologically sympathetic judges and
Justices.197 As the political scientist Howard Gillman has described, the
"increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this
period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a
policy of economic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable
to electoral politics."98
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson generalize from examples like this to
emphasize the importance to American political and constitutional
development of what they call "partisan entrenchment": the strategic
appointment of politically and ideologically aligned judges and Justices whose
tenures will outlast party control over the political branches of government.199
Balkin and Levinson emphasize that presidents and parties are motivated to
engage in partisan entrenchment not just to "secure a bench likely to assist the
President with his current political agenda" but also "to secure future influence
even when the party loses power.""o From this perspective, federal judges and
Justices are simply "temporally extended representatives of particular parties,"
or representatives of "a temporally extended majority," and "hence, of popular
understandings about public policy and the Constitution."" Thus, picking up
shortly after the historical point where Gillman leaves off, Balkin and Levinson
point to the early New Deal period, in which "the federal judiciary, which had
been entrenched by the Republican Party, mostly resisted the Democrats'
196. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Dec. 19, 18oi), in lo THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 302, 302 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904).
197. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts To Advance Their Agendas: Federal
Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 511, 512-13, 516-17 (2002).
198. Id. at 511.
199. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, io66 (2001).
200. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 489, 495 (20o6).
zoi. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 199, at 1o67, 1076.
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proposed construction of the regulatory and welfare state.""2 Examples like
this could be extended through the present. For instance, one account of the
politics of judicial appointments during Ronald Reagan's presidency
emphasizes that the administration "approached [judicial] appointments as a
way 'to institutionalize the Reagan revolution so it can't be set aside no matter
what happens in future presidential elections."'3
2. From Legislative Entrenchment to Administrative and International
Entrenchment
A close analogue to judicial entrenchment is administrative entrenchment.
Temporarily prevailing parties and political coalitions can extend their
influence beyond the boundaries of political defeat by delegating decision-
making authority to an administrative agency that is relatively insulated from
political control, effectively "lock[ing] in policies so they are not reversed or
undone when political power changes hands.""4 For example, McNollgast
portrays the 1946 enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as a
strategy for entrenching the New Deal.2 os When it became increasingly likely
that the Democrats would lose the White House in 1948, the Party-while still
in Congress - supported the imposition of procedural restrictions on the
administrative agencies it had recently created. According to McNollgast, the
Democrats supported the APA and its procedural restraints on agency action as
202. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 200, at 534. From a normative standpoint, Balkin and
Levinson for the most part view partisan entrenchment hrough the judiciary as an attractive
feature of American democracy, one that plays the important role of mediating the tension
between constitutionalism and democratic self-government. Id. But they also believe it can
sometimes go too far. Thus, when it comes to the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), Balkin and Levinson condemn what they see as "five members of the
Court using their powers of judicial review to entrench their party in the Presidency, and
thus, in effect, in the judiciary as well, because of the President's appointments power."
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 199, at 1o8o. Why we should be fine with Presidents and
parties entrenching their policy positions through judicial appointments, but not with
Presidents entrenching themselves in office by way of favorable rulings about election law
coming from their judicial appointees, is not entirely clear.
203. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L.
REv. 191, 220 (2008) (quoting David M. O'Brien, Opinion, Meese's Agenda for Ensuring the
Reagan Legacy, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-o9-28/opinion
/op-9537-_iedwin-meese-iii [http://perma.cc/K3U7-3RAF]).
204. Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 288-89 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell
eds., 2010) (surveying the relevant literature); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
2os. McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
18o, 180-83 (1999).
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a means of "'hard wir[ing]' the policies of the New Deal against an expected
Republican, anti-New Deal political tide." " 6 In particular,
[t]he danger was that a Republican president could use this broad
discretion to undo much of New Deal regulatory policy simply by
appointing anti-New Dealers to head these agencies. Since procedural
restraints make it costly and politically difficult for agencies to change
existing policy, the establishment of procedural due process would
blunt any Republican president's ability to dismantle or shift the
regulatory policies of the New Deal."
Decisions about administrative agency design can also entrench policy by
setting into motion the type of policy-mobilization cycle described earlier. As
Jonathan Macey argues, the design of administrative agencies can "perpetuate
the power and legitimacy of certain [interest] groups and undermine the power
and legitimacy of others."2os Interest groups empowered by a particular agency
design will, of course, be the groups most likely to influence agency decision
making in the future. So, legislatures can entrench their policy preferences by
designing agencies in ways that empower the interest groups that share the
preferences of the enacting legislature.7"
The executive can use agencies as an entrenchment device too. One way is
through what Nina Mendelson has called "agency burrowing," which occurs
when an outgoing, lame-duck presidential administration engages in last-
minute attempts to entrench its policy preferences through various executive
2o6. Id. at 18o.
207. Id. at 192. Once again, we might question why the Republicans did not just enact a statute
repealing or revising the APA. The possibility of entrenchment by way of delegation to, or
design of the structure and process of, administrative agencies assumes that these
arrangements cannot be disentrenched as easily as they were enacted. See Stephenson, supra
note 204.
2o8. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control ofAdministrative Agencies,
8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 93,99 (1992).
209. As one example of this design dynamic, Macey points to the decision about whether an
agency will regulate a range of industries with distinct interests (the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, for example) or whether the agency will be structured so as to
regulate a single industry (the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, for example).
See id. at 99, 104-08. Macey's argument is that an agency with a single-industry jurisdiction
is more likely to empower that industry's interest group than is an agency that regulates a
range of industries and thus competing interest groups. See id. at 104-08. The structure and
design of an agency can ensure that the policy preferences of the regulated industry will
continue to be enacted by the agency, even if the electoral majority that established the
agency is no longer dominant. See id. at 108-09.
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actions.'o On the model of partisan entrenchment in the judiciary, the
administration can engage in "personnel burrowing," converting agency
political appointees into civil service employees in order to keep them in their
jobs beyond the end of the President's term."' The idea is that these appointees
will carry the (former) President's policy preferences forward with them."
Along similar lines, Elizabeth Magill has described how administrative
agencies often impose limitations on their own discretion to act as a means of
ensuring that policies implemented by the sitting agency are difficult to change
by the appointees of the subsequent administration. For example, agencies
sometimes offer greater procedural protections than the APA requires." Just as
procedural rules imposed by the APA create hurdles to policy change, this and
other forms of agency "self-regulation" can increase these hurdles and more
fully insulate the policy status quo. As Magill elaborates, a "self-regulatory
measure might create a process that involves so many key actors that the status
quo bias would be great because it takes so many to agree to change policies or
because the specific actors empowered under the regime will predictably hold
particular views."s
The same basic strategy of entrenchment can be pursued through
"upward" delegations to international organizations. Scholars of international
relations have described how temporarily prevailing political coalitions can
make use of international agreements to preserve policies threatened by
domestic politics by placing them under the control of international
organizations that are insulated by a democracy deficit." 6 Thus, looking at the
human rights context in the late 1940s, Andrew Moravcsik observed that
reciprocally binding human rights obligations tended to be supported only by
newly established - and therefore tenuous - democratic governments, and that
21o. Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 560-61 (2003).
211. Id. at 606.
212. Id. at 6o8.
213. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859, 861-62 (2009).
214. Id. at 868.
215. Id. at 888. Such self-regulatory agency behavior is particularly effective given the judicial
doctrine that requires agencies to adhere to their own procedural rules. See id. at 873-76.
216. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54
INT'L ORG. 519 (2000); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins ofInternational Agreements, 44
VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 511-24 (2004); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions,
Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707, 727-34 (2oo6); Beth A.
Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64
INT'LORG. 225, 231-36 (2oo).
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they tended to be rejected by both established democracies and dictatorships . 17
Moravcsik explains this phenomenon with an entrenchment analysis: the
current political leadership of new democracies signed on to binding human
rights agreements in order to "'lock[] in' the domestic political status quo
against their nondemocratic opponents."`
Even better, both types of delegation-to domestic agencies and to
international decision-making processes -can be combined to create a kind of
double entrenchment. This is the story told by Rachel Brewster about the
entrenchment of banking regulation. 9 A group of central banks, including the
U.S. Federal Reserve, agreed through the Basel Accords to establish minimum
capital requirements for banks.2 "o From the perspective of the U.S. political
process, the requirements contained in the Accords might be viewed as doubly
entrenched: set as an initial matter by the Federal Reserve, an insulated
political actor, and then entrenched against change by the Federal Reserve itself
by the greater political costs of violating international agreements.
E. Summary
Political entrenchment can occur formally, but it can also occur
functionally. Incumbent power holders can preserve their hold on office by
manipulating the formal rules of election law; but they can also manipulate
substantive policy in order to neutralize their political opposition, mobilize
their own supporters, and define the polity that will decide their next election.
Likewise, if formal legislative entrenchment is off the table, power holders can
lock in their policies and programs by organizing and empowering a
constituency that will resist retrenchment or by delegating decision-making
authority to an institution that will remain politically committed to
preservation.
A recent article by Richard Lazarus, tellingly entitled Super Wicked Problems
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To Liberate the Future, offers a useful
illustration of the discussion so far." In a moment of hope that Congress
and the President would enact climate change legislation, Lazarus takes
as his project to design this potential statute in such a way as to entrench
217. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 219-20 (2000).
218. Id. at 244.
219. Brewster, supra note 216, at 517-18.
220. Id. at 517.
221. Lazarus, supra note 14.
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it against political opposition in the future. He recommends, and
sketches, "precommitment strategies" that would "insulate programmatic
implementation to a significant extent from [the] powerful political and
economic interests" that will predictably be opposed to, and intent
upon eroding, an aggressive environmental regulatory regime.m
"[N]otwithstanding th[e] undemocratic effects" of such strategies, Lazarus
believes that current lawmakers would be justified in "making it more difficult
for future legislators and agency officials to substitute their views of sound
policy for the judgment of past lawmakers" for the purpose of saving the planet
from the catastrophic effects of climate change.
Of course, one way of entrenching a climate change statute would be to
make it formally unrepealable. Lazarus considers this option, but ultimately
rejects it, in part because legislative entrenchment is of dubious
constitutionality and would become a source of controversy, and in part
because an absolute ban on amendment would be too extreme.'
Instead, Lazarus recommends a series of functional entrenchment
strategies. One possibility would be to "design federal climate legislation in a
manner that would create a powerful political constituency with a strong
economic incentive favoring the legislation's preservation" -for example, by
including a tradable emissions program that would attract large investments in
emissions rights.22 Another would be "to couple domestic climate change
legislation with the United States' agreement to international treaty
obligations," which would "significantly raise the political cost of any
retreat."'6 Other measures would be designed to protect and promote climate
change regulation in the executive branch, pursuant to statutory delegation.
On the model of the Federal Reserve, Lazarus suggests ways of insulating
agency officials in charge of implementation from "pressures likely to derive
from short-term economic concerns, which [might] undermine the law's
effectiveness."7̀ He also suggests ways to structure the regulatory process in
order "to enhance the influence of interest groups that are concerned about
protecting future generations but which otherwise lack the necessary economic
or political clout.""5  As Lazarus clearly appreciates, these strategies of
222. Id. at 1158.
223. Id. at 1157.
224. Id. at 1207-09.
225. Id. at 1210.
226. Id. at 1209.
227. Id. at 1212; see also id. at 1212-16 (describing strategies for insulating agency officials).
228. Id. at 1212; see also id. at 1216-25 (describing strategies for enhancing interest-group clout).
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functional entrenchment serve as close substitutes for formal entrenchment of
either the legislative or electoral varieties.
The Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 provide another vivid illustration of the
substitutability of formal and functional entrenchment. The tax cuts were
enacted with sunset provisions, so that they would automatically expire in
2010.229 This raised no flags from a legal perspective; quite the contrary, sunset
provisions are precisely the opposite of the kind of formal legislative
entrenchment of which public law disapproves. Yet political observers noticed
that the tax cuts, even while couched as temporary for purposes of facilitating
enactment and disguising their likely budgetary implications, were in fact
engineered to be self-entrenching.2 30 The reforms were "tailored to shape the
politics of tax cuts down the line in ways that favored tax-cutters' long term
goals,"231 creating a political dynamic that would lead to their extension-
essentially duplicating the effect of an unrepealable statute. Furthermore,
linking legislative to electoral entrenchment, Republicans might well have
expected that political support for the tax cuts would "provide a powerful
motivation for the wealthy to bankroll Republican reelection efforts in the
future."23 ' Once again, the moral is that, even if the pathways of formal
entrenchment are closed, there will often be a functional pathway that leads to
the same destination.
III. RATIONALIZING ENTRENCHMENT?
We have seen that courts and public law scholars view formal electoral and
legislative entrenchment as matters of grave normative concern and as
appropriate targets for legal regulation. We have also seen that in many
contexts functional entrenchment strategies appear to be close substitutes for
these formal ones. Yet the seemingly ubiquitous phenomenon of functional
entrenchment has never been perceived as problematic in public law.23' And to
229. For a description of the tax cuts and their sunset provisions, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun
Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 338,
370-83 (2006).
230. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 60-62 (2005) (describing this feature and quoting one
commentator's observation that "[t]he lesson of the Bush tax-cutting record is that what
matters is structural change and political leverage down the line").
231. Id. at 58.
232. Id. at 61.
233. This descriptive claim is mostly an inference from omission. However, in response to Posner
and Vermeule's example of bicycles in the park, see supra note 103 and accompanying text,
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make matters more confusing, in at least one major area-constitutional law-
entrenchment is widely embraced.
In this Part, we explore whether there is any way of rationalizing public
law's seemingly inconsistent treatment of the various forms of political
entrenchment. Section ILA asks whether there is any good reason for viewing
formal entrenchment as a bigger problem or a more sensible target of legal
regulation than functional entrenchment. Section III.B then expands the frame
of analysis, first, to ask whether there is any good reason for regarding
subconstitutional entrenchment as any more problematic than constitutional
entrenchment; and second, to question whether a meaningful category of
entrenchment-or the reasons for worrying about it-can be coherently
bounded at all.
A. The Uneasy Case for Policing Formal but Not Functional Entrenchment
Is there any good reason for believing that formal entrenchment should be
prohibited and policed, while functional entrenchment should be tolerated or
ignored? One possibility is that formal entrenchment is more harmful than
functional entrenchment. Another is that, even if the two forms are equally
harmful, formal entrenchment is easier to identify and therefore a more
workable target for legal regulation. We discuss each of these possibilities in
turn.
i. Harmfulness
The near-consensus view in the public law literature is that formal electoral
and legislative entrenchment are socially harmful and legally undesirable, if not
outright prohibited.34 As we have seen, commentators emphasize the unfair
aggrandizement of political power by upstream decision makers at the expense
of their successors, the frustration of present majority will, and the costs of
locking in bad or anachronistic policies.235 Nightmare scenarios are front and
critics of legislative entrenchment have been explicit in insisting that formal entrenchment is
a different and more problematic phenomenon. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 67, at 530-31;
Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 1813-19; Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment of
Entrenchment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231, 238-39 (2003).
234. Posner and Vermeule are a major exception with respect to legislative entrenchment, and
much of what they say in defense of that practice applies to entrenchment more broadly. See
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24. Eule goes out of his way to recognize some of the
functional benefits of entrenchment before proceeding to conclude that legislative
entrenchment is nonetheless unconstitutional. See Eule, supra note 67, at 390-91.
235. See supra Section I.B.
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center. A lame-duck Democratic Congress, facing a newly elected Republican
Congress and President, enacts a statute entrenching its entire legislative
program against modification or repeal.3 After the enactment of an
entrenched statute defunding all nuclear weapons for ten years, an unforeseen
threat to U.S. national security arises that only nuclear weapons could deter.2"
When a temporarily dominant political party or coalition takes measures to
cement itself in power or block the channels of political change, the specter of
oligarchy or dictatorship menacingly looms.
The social science literature on functional entrenchment takes a more
balanced normative perspective. While social scientists certainly have not
missed the fact that self-serving political actors can use various entrenchment
techniques to lock in their political gains at the expense of opponents and the
public at large, the literature on functional entrenchment recognizes that, in at
least some contexts, "entrenchment is a legitimate goal in a democratic
polity.",238 After all, the risk of locking in ill-motivated or mistaken policies
must be weighed against the possibility of insulating good policies against ill-
motivated or mistaken reversals. If, for instance, preventing global warming
will improve social welfare in the long run, then society might well benefit by
insulating these policies against short-term or partial interests as Lazarus
contends.'9 Delegation to central banks, international organizations, and
independent judiciaries can be a vehicle for entrenching sound monetary
policies, free trade, and human rights.2o
Even if there is no reason to expect prior political decisions to be
substantively better than later ones, social scientists emphasize that stability
and predictability can be valuable in their own right." Thus, many of the
foundational contributions to the political science and economics literature on
entrenchment emphasize the benefits of credible commitment.242 A
government that can credibly and successfully commit itself to repaying debts
or to preserving economic entitlements will be able to borrow money on more
favorable terms or encourage private sector investment; a government that can
credibly commit not to bail out banks that make risky investments may be able
236. See Sterk, supra note 233, at 237.
237. See Eule, supra note 67, at 386-87.
238. Patashnik & Zelizer, supra note 12, at 1083.
239. See Lazarus, supra note 14.
24o. See supra Section II.D.
241. See Levinson, supra note 17, at 673-75 (surveying beneficial forms of commitment drawn
from the social science literature).
242. See, e.g., id. at 673-74.
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to avert a future financial crisis; and so on. Entrenchment-induced stability can
also serve to "tak[e] particularly contentious issues or subjects off the table"
and to allow controversies to be settled in a lasting way, economizing on
conflict, reducing rent-seeking, and freeing up political resources for other
uses.4 3
In short, entrenchment can be used for good as well as for ill. But- and
here is the crucial point - this goes for formal as well as functional
entrenchment. An unamendable statutory formula could replace the delegated
authority of the Federal Reserve as a means of locking in sound monetary
policy. If stringent environmental regulation will provide long-term benefits in
preventing climate change, those benefits could also be achieved through
legislative entrenchment, or perhaps alternatively by tilting the electoral
playing field in favor of liberal Democrats.
In sum, there is nothing about the distinction between formal and
functional entrenchment that would appear to correlate with social harms or
benefits. Both can be motivated by the narrow political self-interest of parties,
politicians, and interest groups; or, alternatively, by broader, public-regarding
motivations. And both can be used to accomplish the same outcomes,
insulating officeholders and policies against downstream majorities with
different preferences. Given the broad substitutability of formal and functional
entrenchment mechanisms, there is no reason to believe that one would be
categorically more harmful (or beneficial) than the other.
2. Identifiability
Despite their general substitutability, formal entrenchment does appear to
differ from functional entrenchment in one important way: it will almost
always be easier to identify. On the (questionable) assumption that
entrenchment is generally a bad thing, this could explain why formal
243. Id. at 675. While these benefits follow most naturally from the stability of policy decisions,
the advantages of stabilizing electoral outcomes should be broadly similar in kind. The
entrenchment of incumbents may contribute to more effective governance, on the theory
that more experienced legislators with accumulated knowledge of their constituents and
their needs will outperform a rotating cast of novices. The entrenchment of parties or
coalitions might also lengthen political time-horizons, facilitating the implementation of
policies with longer-term social benefits as opposed to focusing politicians on short-term
political gains. Electoral entrenchment should also reduce the frequency of dramatic,
destabilizing shifts in policies that can come with changes in party control of government.
And, of course, if the entrenchment of parties and political coalitions leads to the
entrenchment of a platform or set of policy outcomes, then all of the potential advantages of
legislative entrenchment with respect to stability, predictability, and commitment should
carry over.
459
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
entrenchment alone is singled out by public law. If strategies of formal
entrenchment can be more readily identified and distinguished from benign
political behavior, that could make them more sensible targets for judicial
scrutiny or other forms of legal regulation than their functional brethren. 4
Whatever else might be said for the prohibition on formal legislative
entrenchment, it is simple enough to administer. Statutes that explicitly
announce their own entrenchment hrough prohibitions or special procedural
obstacles to repeal are easy to identify and to distinguish from ordinary
statutes. To be sure, there is considerable ambiguity about how far beyond this
core case the prohibition on legislative entrenchment might be extended -to
framework statutes, internal legislative rules like the Senate filibuster, (some
types of) government contracts, and so on."s But at least in the core case, the
definitional boundaries of entrenchment are clear, and the statutes that fit the
definition announce themselves unambiguously.
When we move beyond the simple case of legislative entrenchment,
however, the task of defining and identifying a forbidden category of even
formal entrenchment becomes more difficult. Electoral entrenchment is
illustrative. Despite the calls of election law scholars for a more aggressive
judicial role in policing entrenchment in this domain, courts have been
daunted by the difficulty of demarcating a judicially administrable category of
forbidden conduct.4 7
One source of difficulty lies in determining the relevant baseline for
identifying impermissible entrenchment. As we have seen, diagnoses of
entrenchment typically rely upon baselines set by vague reference to the
"ordinary" or ideal difficulty of effecting political change. 2' In the context of
election law, courts and commentators have struggled over what, precisely, the
right baseline should be.49 When it comes to the partisan gerrymandering of
election districts, for example, political entrenchment must be measured
against some baseline of politically "fair" districting. What the metric of
24. Cf McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 24, at 442 (arguing that there are "strong reasons
grounded in administrative costs" for policing formal entrenchment mechanisms but not
"informal ones," such as Posner and Vermeule's bicycles in the park example).
245. We return to these ambiguities below. See infra Section III.B.2.
246. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 5o and accompanying text.
z48. See supra Section I.A.
249. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 533-34. As Klarman (among others) has argued, these baseline
problems can be sidestepped by a procedural solution to the problem of entrenchment
through gerrymandering- turning over districting to some sort of impartial commission or
to a computer program. See id. at 534.
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fairness should be, however, is not clear. Courts and commentators have
disagreed for decades about whether an unfair, or entrenching, partisan
distribution of districts should be determined by reference to a baseline of
majority rule, proportional representation, or something else.25o In Vieth v.
Jubelirer, a plurality of the Supreme Court threw up its collective hands,
describing the attempt to arrive at a judicially manageable standard as
"[e]ighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it.""
A further difficulty is that laws that may have the purpose and effect of
entrenching a party or policy may also have other purposes and effects worthy
of democratic respect. Here again, election law is illustrative.s2 Campaign
finance regulations might well benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers
or one party at the expense of another, but they may also aim to mitigate the
influence of wealth on elections and equalize the political influence of
constituents across income groups."' Ballot access restrictions and voter
identification requirements can be used to entrench parties and incumbents,
but they can also play a legitimate role in preventing voter confusion and
fraud.4 Multimember districts can be used to dilute the voting power of racial
minority groups and entrench white majorities and their preferred
representatives, but they can also generate representatives who are responsive
to the needs of the broader political community rather than to local, parochial
interests.2 ss How courts would police the purpose or effects of laws like this to
screen for entrenchment, and how they would balance the benefits of
preventing entrenchment against the costs of sacrificing the non-
entrenchment-related benefits of such laws, is also unclear.
Whatever the prospects for overcoming these dual difficulties of
indeterminate baselines and mixed motives in the election law context,"'
extending antientrenchment review to the vast universe of functional
entrenchment would seem to present a challenge of a different order.
Starting with baselines, any attempt to operationalize a prohibition on the
functional entrenchment of parties or political coalitions would have to
250. See id. at 533-34.
251. 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Pildes, supra note 42, at 66-83
(discussing the difficulty of formulating a standard for partisan entrenchment).
252. See Klarman, supra note 4, at 529-30 (describing the problem of mixed motives in the
context of election law).
253. See id. at 536-38.
254. See id. at 535-36.
255. See id. at 538.
256. See id. at 528-39 (suggesting ways in which courts might successfully implement a regime of
antientrenchment review in the context of election law).
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confront the fact that many changes in policy might be viewed as tilting the
political playing field in favor of one side or the other. Imagine the position of a
court charged with policing against partisan entrenchment through labor law.
On the one hand, an expansive and protective labor statute might be viewed as
entrenching Democrats because it facilitates the growth of unions, which in
turn support Democratic candidates. On the other hand, a restrictive and
punitive labor statute might be viewed as entrenching Republicans. From the
perspective of a status quo ante baseline, any change in labor law could be
viewed as entrenchment because one party or the other will likely benefit
politically. Even no change in labor law might be viewed as entrenching, if the
decision to do nothing were cast as refusing or failing to enact some salient
pro- or anti-labor policy. The same quandary would arise in assessing any
change (or even the absence of any change) in policy in the domains of tort
reform, immigration, and many other areas with predictable political feedback
effects.
As we have seen, it is not even clear whether-or when-the status quo
ante should be the dispositive baseline for measuring entrenchment.5 7 If we
looked instead to majoritarian preferences, that might lead to a different view
of partisan entrenchment. Returning to the labor law example, suppose a
prounion policy shift has the effect of bringing previously disfranchised
voters to the polls and thereby pulling partisan and policy support closer
to majoritarian political preferences. Now a prior enactment diagnosis
of entrenchment competes with a majoritarian baseline diagnosis of
dis-entrenchment. A court called upon to police labor law for partisan
entrenchment might well wonder what to do.
Comparable problems would arise in policing the entrenchment of any
policy. In the absence of formal criteria for entrenchment, some assessment
would have to be made of the difficulty of revising or repealing the policy once
enacted, as compared to some baseline measure of the "ordinary" difficulty of
policy change. A countermajoritarian measure seems unpromising, given the
pervasively countermajoritarian tendencies of the American political system.s
According to one recent study, the probability that a policy change supported
by three-quarters of Americans will be enacted into law is only thirty-nine
percent.2 59 And, as elaborated below, it is quite likely that many, perhaps even
most, of the policies that have been enacted into law would not have been
chosen by present majorities. Short of concluding that much of current law is
257. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 287-288 and accompanying text.
259. See MARTIN GILENs, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 74 (2012).
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impermissibly entrenched, it is hard to know how courts (or other assessors)
would proceed.
Switching to a status quo ante baseline would raise a different set of
challenges. The question would then become whether a policy was, or was
likely to become, more politically difficult to revise or repeal than it had been to
enact in the first place. Answering this question would require some empirical
assessment of the difficulty of effecting political change at different points in
time. Such an assessment would need to control for the political popularity of
the relevant policy. Again, entrenchment entails some impediment to the
realization of political preferences; the accurate reflection of increasingly
favorable preferences would be evidence of democratic responsiveness, the
opposite of entrenchment. But distinguishing political popularity from the
kinds of "artificial" impediments to policy change that should qualify as
entrenchment is not straightforward. When should we view the strengthening
of political opposition to change as a structural barrier evincing entrenchment
as opposed to a perfectly valid expression of democratic will? Should we always
think of policies that mobilize and empower supportive interest groups as
becoming entrenched, or are there conditions under which we should view this
dynamic as legitimately increasing political support? Answering these
questions will require a much fuller account of the difference between well-
functioning and distorted democracy than existing theories of entrenchment
have contemplated.o
The problem of mixed motives and effects also seems more pervasive and
severe as applied to functional entrenchment. As we have seen, labor law, tort
reform, and immigration policy can serve as entrenchment mechanisms; but
they are also labor law and tort reform and immigration policy. When
entrenchment is accomplished through changes in substantive policy, there
will always be a plausible case to be made that the motivation was policy rather
than politics, and, to the extent this is true, invalidating legislation on
entrenchment grounds would mean blocking the enactment of democratically
preferred policies. Something similar is true of functional entrenchment by
way of changing the locus of political decision making. Decisions to delegate to
courts, administrative agencies, and international governance bodies create
potential benefits that stand entirely apart from entrenchment and that would
be sacrificed if these decisions were blocked on anti-entrenchment grounds.
Whatever the democratic costs of entrenchment, the democratic costs of
preventing entrenchment might also be substantial.
26o. As we discuss further below, once we let go of formal markers -explicit prohibitions on
repeal, supermajority requirements, and the like-the precise definition of entrenchment
quickly begins to blur. See infra Section III.B.2.
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All of these conceptual difficulties in identifying functional entrenchment
would be compounded by empirical problems. Courts charged with policing
entrenchment presumably would need to predict the effects of policy
enactments and delegations, or (what is not so different) to ascertain the likely
predictions, or motives, of enacting coalitions. Here courts would run up
against not only their own institutional limitations but also the limits of
political science. Notwithstanding the many plausible and instructive
explanations for how various political arrangements have contributed to
entrenchment, there is nothing like a reliable predictive model. Confronted
with the question whether major policy reforms like the Affordable Care Act or
Dodd-Frank are likely to become entrenched, social scientists can do little more
than point to a number of possibly relevant variables.6' Case studies suggest
that subtle, contextual differences can often be determinative.
For all of these reasons, functional entrenchment would be considerably
more difficult to identify and police than at least some types of formal
entrenchment. Even if the formal and functional varieties of entrenchment are
equally harmful, therefore, legal regulation might sensibly focus only on the
former-looking under the light at formal entrenchment while leaving
functional entrenchment in the dark.
Like many partial solutions, however, this one raises a "second-best"
concern. If avenues of formal entrenchment are foreclosed, the obvious
alternative would be for political actors to pursue functional entrenchment
strategies instead. As we have emphasized, such strategies often seem to be
close substitutes for formal legislative and electoral entrenchment. No doubt
they are not perfect substitutes. Political actors who make use of formal
entrenchment devices presumably do so because they are more effective or less
costly than the functional alternatives. At the very least, however, we should
predict that shutting down formal entrenchment mechanisms would have the
effect of increasing the use of functional alternatives.
261. See, e.g., Patashnik & Zelizer, supra note 12, at 1079-83.
262. For example, whereas recipients of non-means-tested programs like Social Security are "at
least as active" as the public as a whole, other public-assistance programs, such as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), appear to have demobilized their beneficiaries,
leaving the programs quite vulnerable to retrenchment. Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare: Policy
Design, Political Learning, and Political Action, 93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 363, 365 (1999) (quoting
SYDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 210
(1995)). Scholars explain these variable outcomes by pointing to subtle differences in
program design, such as how the beneficiaries' relationship with AFDC caseworkers shapes
their political attitudes. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 1o8, at 129. Case studies of legislative
durability and the opposite are collected and analyzed in LIvING LEGISLATION: DURABILITY,
CHANGE, AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN LAWMAKING (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Eric M.
Patashnik eds., 2012); and PATASHNIK, supra note 12.
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This substitution effect would obviously reduce the benefit of policing
formal entrenchment. But i might also impose additional social costs. Unlike
their formal counterparts, functional entrenchment strategies inject a particular
type of strategic political consideration into substantive policymaking.
Consider again the example of labor law. The approach to labor law that
Southern Democrats found most effective for entrenching themselves in office
may not have been the approach to labor law they would have chosen purely as
a matter of policy; at the very least, labor law would have been less of a
legislative priority had it not offered an alternative path to entrenchment. The
same is true of other political actors who have turned to labor law as a vehicle
of entrenchment: but for Senator Taft's political entrenchment goals, we may
never have gotten the Taft-Hartley Act. Moreover, it seems reasonable to
expect that policy made for reasons other than entrenchment will tend to be
better policy from the perspective of public welfare. For example, despite the
many policy advantages of a carbon tax, the goal of entrenching climate change
legislation points away from such a tax and toward a cap-and-trade regime.3
In sum, functional entrenchment is doubly distorting -distorting on both a
political and a policy margin. 6 ' This at least complicates the case for policing
formal but not functional entrenchment. That approach might yield somewhat
less entrenchment, but the entrenchment that does result will tend to carry
greater costs. Returning to the climate change example, we might well do
better by permitting the formal statutory entrenchment of an efficient carbon
tax than by encouraging political actors to substitute a relatively inefficient cap-
and-trade approach in order to duplicate the entrenchment functionally. More
generally, if functional entrenchment cannot be regulated effectively, policing
formal entrenchment alone is not obviously the right fallback position.
The greater identifiability of formal entrenchment techniques suggests a
final reason for skepticism about making those methods the exclusive focus of
judicial scrutiny. As generations of constitutional theorists have argued, judicial
review might be best reserved for cases of political process failure.265 To be
sure, entrenchment might be viewed as one such failure. But at least in some
contexts, that failure will be preventable by voters and interest groups
mounting political resistance to entrenchment efforts. The more visible these
efforts, the more resistance might be generated. If this is right, then there
263. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1193-95.
264. To the extent functional entrenchment strategies involve delegations, the relevant distortion
would be in the structure of government and processes of political decision making. Here,
too, we should expect considerable spillover costs.
265. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
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might be somewhat less of a need for judicial review in the context of formal
entrenchment, which is relatively visible, than in the case of functional
entrenchment, which is harder to identify and to distinguish from ordinary or
benign politics. In this regard as well, public law's current approach to
regulating entrenchment may have things backwards.
3. (In) conclusion
Once the continuity between the circumscribed categories of formal
entrenchment and the vast terrain of functional entrenchment has been
recognized, could we nonetheless conclude that a sensible regulatory regime
should continue to focus exclusively on the former while ignoring the latter?
Perhaps. At least some types of legislative and electoral entrenchment are easily
identifiable and formally distinguishable from the workings of ordinary
politics. Even if these mechanisms of political entrenchment are no more
socially harmful than many others, the lower enforcement and error costs
might lead courts and other legal regulators to conclude that it is optimal to
address some part of the entrenchment problem while leaving the rest alone.
We have sought to show, however, that this analysis is, at the very least,
incomplete. Some types of formal entrenchment are easier to identify and
quarantine than others. And the same might be true of some discrete types of
functional entrenchment, which might turn out to be no less amenable to
regulatory spotlighting and excision if courts or scholars ever decided to make
the attempt. A more comprehensive assessment of the workability of policing
entrenchment would have to get down to cases and institutions, in the manner
of ongoing debates over the viability of policing partisan gerrymandering and
other entrenchment devices in election law. Such an assessment would also
have to reckon with the realistic scope of the substitution and double-
distortion problem: in contexts where barriers to formal entrenchment create
hydraulic pressure to substitute more socially harmful strategies of functional
entrenchment, the regulatory calculus will be different. Further, the extent to
which entrenchment might be self-correcting through ordinary political
processes should also bear upon the need for judicial and other forms of legal
regulation. In the absence of a more comprehensive assessment along all of
these lines -and, indeed, in the absence of any prior recognition by courts and
scholars of functional entrenchment as a potential problem-there is little
reason for confidence that the prevailing approach of public law toward
entrenchment is in any way optimal.
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The same is true of the prior, and more fundamental, question of whether
formal entrenchment-or any other category of comparable political
behavior-is actually harmful or socially undesirable. As the discussion of
constitutional entrenchment below will elaborate, it is far from obvious
whether entrenchment generally should be viewed as a democratic pathology
that we should be striving to extirpate, or, instead, as a socially beneficial
constraint on untrammeled majority rule. Probably the best answer is some of
both. Some uses of entrenchment will be widely perceived as beneficial, others
as clearly harmful, and still others debatable. One need only consider examples
like Social Security or Lazarus's entrenchment scheme for climate change
legislation to appreciate the difficulties and disagreements that will inevitably
arise in distinguishing socially beneficial from socially destructive
entrenchment. In these and other cases, we might wonder how the potential
benefits of credible commitment and political stability should be weighed
against the democratic sacrifice of present majority will, or how to distinguish
the kinds of "good" policies that should be entrenched from the "bad" ones
that should not. These difficulties and disagreements are only compounded
when the relevant assessment is categorical. A robust normative theory for
sorting socially beneficial versus harmful types of entrenchment would have to
be combined with a well-developed empirical sense, or prediction, of the
distribution of these various kinds. But there is no reason to believe that these
lines would break along a simplistic division between formal and functional
entrenchment. If public law theorists who selectively condemn electoral and
legislative entrenchment are conducting categorical cost-benefit calculations
along these lines, they have never shown their work.
B. Extensions
1. The Uncertain Case for Distinguishing Constitutional Entrenchment
Condemnation of formal entrenchment in the electoral and legislative
spheres sits uneasily with public law's longstanding, if at times ambivalent,
embrace of constitutional entrenchment. The difficulty of achieving a
constitutional amendment through Article V raises well-rehearsed concerns
about the countermajoritarian, or anti-democratic, nature of constitutionalism
that run parallel to the standard set of concerns about entrenchment at the
electoral and legislative levels. Entrenched constitutions are said to substitute
the "dead hand" control of the past for present majority will. Moreover,
266. See infra Section III.B.i.
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entrenched constitutional rules and rights can serve to lock in maladapted or
evil political arrangements in much the same way as entrenchment at the
electoral or legislative level. Consider the constitutional entrenchment of
slavery, requiring a bloody civil war to eradicate, or the Supreme Court's
entrenched constitutional objections to the New Deal's recovery program,
which sought to prevent the collapse of capitalism and democracy.
The accepted wisdom appears to be that constitutional entrenchment
comes with a set of benefits outweighing these costs.6 7 But these benefits are
no different in kind than the potential benefits of electoral or legislative
entrenchment. At the constitutional and subconstitutional levels alike, the risks
of locking in bad decisions must be weighed against the rewards of
precommitting to good decisions that might otherwise be sacrificed on account
of short-term interests or political pathologies -whether free speech or sound
monetary policy. Similarly, the benefits of political stability- cashed out in
terms of credible commitment, beneficial reliance, or dampened political
contestation- seem broadly similar in the constitutional and subconstitutional
contexts.
Not surprisingly, then, some theorists have viewed constitutional and
subconstitutional entrenchment as normative equivalents -equally bad, or
equally not bad. Klarman takes the former view, emphasizing that
constitutional entrenchment shares the democratic pathologies of electoral and
legislative entrenchment, and viewing all as equally suspect."' Posner and
Vermeule take the opposite view, pointing to the parallels with constitutional
entrenchment as an argument for treating legislative entrenchment as no less
pernicious or permissible."
More commonly, however, public law theorists who condemn electoral and
legislative entrenchment embrace entrenchment at the constitutional level.270
In fact, the prohibition on legislative entrenchment is sometimes cast as an
entrenched constitutional rule -and one that should inarguably command our
267. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 67, at 390 ("It would appear, therefore, that whatever practical
objections can be raised against entrenchment are concerns that the Framers were willing to
put aside for the benefits that barriers to change bring with them.").
268. Klarman, supra note 4, at 502-09.
269. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1670-71 ("[A]n entrenching statute is like a mini-
constitution in its self-conscious effort to control the voting practices or policy choices of
future majorities.").
270. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 72 ("[O]nly by a constitutional amendment can one truly bind
the future: unless we keep clearly in mind that distinction between a constitutional
amendment and a bill or resolution, we have really lost our way.").
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respect." This raises the question of what, if anything, beyond positive law
differentiates constitutional from subconstitutional entrenchment?
One possibility relates to the process through which constitutional rules
and rights are enacted. Most obviously, in contrast to ordinary legislation,
constitutional ratification and amendment formally require supermajoritarian
political support." To the extent broader political support correlates with
better decision making, the benefits of entrenching constitutional norms might
be higher, on average, than the benefits of entrenching the products of
majoritarian legislative processes."' Beyond formal voting rules, a "dualist"
perspective on constitutional democracy portrays constitutional norms as
emerging from rare moments of "higher" politics, involving greater popular
participation, deliberation, or public-regarding motivation than the kinds of
disengaged, compromised, and self-interested "lower" politics that ordinarily
prevail.'7 In this view, entrenching the products of higher-quality
constitutional decision-making processes against revision through the
corrupted processes of ordinary politics might augment popular sovereignty
and improve social welfare. Entrenching the inferior products of ordinary
politics would carry no such benefits.
Another possible basis for differentiating constitutional entrenchment
relates to the kinds of political outcomes that are being protected against
change. Perhaps the most important thing the Constitution has accomplished
is to establish and solidify the basic structural framework of government - the
bicameral structure of Congress; the procedural outlines of the Article I,
Section 7 lawmaking process; the electoral cycles and terms of office for
representatives, senators, and presidents; and the like. Entrenchment of the
basic institutional structure of political decision making may be especially
valuable. The alternative to settled and stable agreement at this fundamental
level of political organization is not organized democratic contestation but
271. There is no logical contradiction here. If a prohibition on subconstitutional entrenchment
can be derived from the text and structure of the Constitution, that is reason enough to
respect it, without inferring any prejudice against the entrenchment of the Constitution
itself. Setting aside the dictates of positive law, however, the differentiating features of
constitutionalism remain to be identified.
272. Depending on the baseline being used to measure entrenchment, the symmetrical
supermajoritarian hurdles necessary for constitutional enactment and constitutional revision
could mean that constitutional law is not entrenched at all. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
273. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 24, at 426-29 (defending the distinction between
constitutional and legislative entrenchment on the ground that constitutional law requires a
supermajority to enact, and supermajoritarian decision making tends to be higher quality).
274. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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sheer anarchy. Moreover, the costs of entrenchment at this level may be
relatively low. To the extent the constitutional structure of government creates
a relatively even playing field for competing political interests- setting the
rules of the political game, without determining the winners and losers -
fairness concerns about artificially privileging particular partisan or policy
interests will be mitigated." One could argue, then, that the constitutional
entrenchment of the basic structures and processes of political decision making
is both more valuable and less destructive than the entrenchment of specific
power holders and policy outcomes - more democratically enabling than
disabling. 6
Neither of these approaches to differentiating constitutional entrenchment
is straightforward or self-evidently persuasive. Parties, political movements,
and policies that command supermajoritarian or qualitatively higher-order
democratic support might stake a comparable claim to entrenchment through
electoral or legislative pathways. And electoral and legislative entrenchment
might also contribute to locking in the basic institutional structures of
government, given that most of the rules structuring the administrative state,
the democratic process, the internal workings of Congress, and other aspects of
the organization and operation of government are the product of
subconstitutional aw. Indeed, it is these two features that motivate theorists to
reconceptualize some formally subconstitutional rules as functionally
constitutional. Thus, in the view of some theorists, small-c constitutional rules
are just those that serve to "constitute" the government, a set that includes the
many formally subconstitutional rules relating to the structure of governmental
75. This is clearly an oversimplification. Enumerated rights and other constitutional provisions
operate to entrench policies in much the same way as legislative and electoral entrenchment.
Thus, constitutional prohibitions on slavery and Jim Crow segregation effectively entrench a
policy regime of racial integration and equality; the First Amendment entrenches a policy
slant toward religious liberty and free speech; the constitutional protection of abortion
rights prevents their reversal; the Second Amendment blocks the enactment of
comprehensive gun control laws; and so on. Constitutional structure, too, can be
understood as a means of generating and entrenching certain policy outcomes. The original
design of the federal government was supposed to protect vulnerable minorities, including
creditors, religious sects, and slaveholders, against hostile majorities, and to do so in a more
durable way than rights and other mere "parchment" barriers. Whatever is left of that idea,
constitutional structure continues to generate predictable policy outcomes, or at least
general biases. For example, by providing for exit and inciting jurisdictional competition,
constitutional federalism makes certain kinds of redistribution more difficult to accomplish
than would be the case in a completely centralized system of government. See Weingast,
supra note 163. To this extent, the policy consequences of constitutionally entrenched
federalism will overlap in some predictable ways with the policy consequences of
entrenching Republicans in office or legislatively entrenching lower tax rates.
276. See HoLMES, supra note 28, at 6-8.
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institutions or the workings of the political process.' At the same time, as we
have seen, other theorists view the special democratic pedigree of statutes like
the Civil Rights Act as markers of quasi-constitutional status.' The functional
lesson here is that (formal) constitutional law does not have a monopoly over
the entrenchment of structural arrangements or of the fruits of higher-order
democratic politics.
A functional perspective complicates the assessment of constitutional
entrenchment in other ways as well. Most fundamentally, once we look beyond
the formal notion that constitutional change can only be accomplished through
Article V, the extent to which constitutional law is in fact politically entrenched
becomes an open question. Constitutional rules and rights that can be changed
simply by shifting the vote of a single Supreme Court Justice (or the opinion of
a single President) may be no more entrenched, and may be quite a bit less
entrenched, than an ordinary statute." The formal vision of an entrenched
constitution contrasts with the widely recognized reality of continuous
constitutional change through processes of judicial interpretation, political
construction, and popular acceptance.8o Dramatic structural changes-such as
the growth of the administrative state, the decline of federalism, and the
expansion of presidential power -have taken place through these channels, in
response to shifting patterns of political demand. The scope and existence of
constitutional rights-for example, in the contexts of economic liberty, free
speech, race and gender equality, and sexual orientation- have also changed
markedly in response to shifts in public opinion and political mobilization.81
Generations of political scientists and legal scholars have documented that the
content of constitutional law tends to converge with the preferences of
national-level majorities."2
277. See Llewellyn, supra note 95, at 31; Young, supra note 99, at 415-16.
278. See supra notes 97-98, iol and accompanying text.
279. Recall Young's observation that the Social Security Act's promise of government financial
support in old age is less likely to be abolished than canonical constitutional norms such as
abortion rights. See supra note too and accompanying text.
28o. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 29 (arguing that the Constitution is shaped akin to
common law to reflect contemporary norms).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(2009); ROBERT G. McCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960) (" [I]t is hard
to find a single historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a
really clear wave of public demand."); Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (" [T]he policy views
dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
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None of this belies the possibility that at least some aspects of
constitutional law are at least somewhat entrenched against majoritarian
demands for change. A number of the most important structural features of the
U.S. government-the bicameral structure of Congress; the basic outlines of
the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process; the electoral cycles and terms of
office for representatives, senators, and presidents; and the like-have
remained mostly noncontroversial and more or less intact since the Founding,
even as their original claims to functional and political efficacy have eroded.
For example, it seems unlikely that Americans writing on a blank slate would
recreate the rule of equal state representation in the Senate; yet that rule would
now be formidably difficult to dislodge. Even very popular Presidents do not
run for third terms or dissolve Congress. In these and other respects,
constitutional rules and rights appear to create effective constraints on political
preferences.
Beyond these anecdotal observations, however, we know very little about
the precise patterns of entrenchment that make some constitutional rules and
rights more difficult to change than others.8 We also know very little about
the mechanisms through which functional constitutional entrenchment comes
about. We should expect, however, that these mechanisms will operate quite
similarly in the constitutional and subconstitutional domains-by way of
selectively empowering certain groups whose interests and incentives align
with compliance and preservation.8' The overarching point is that, whatever
the formal rules governing political and legal change, change will in fact always
be possible and predictable whenever it serves the interests of powerful
political actors. As James Madison famously put it, constitutional and other
legal rules may create merely "parchment barriers" that can be ignored or
overridden at will. 8s As Madison also recognized, however, parchment
prohibitions can be converted into meaningful constraints when the political
process is arranged in such a way that political actors who support
constitutional rules and rights have the power to defend them.286 These are
precisely the kinds of political arrangements and dynamics that we saw in Part
the lawmaking majorities of the United States."); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore
Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1721, 1749-50 (2001) (stressing
how rarely the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations have diverged from the
political preferences of national majorities).
283. See generally Levinson, supra note 17.
284. See id. at 672-716 (assimilating political and constitutional entrenchment and identifying a
set of mechanisms common to both).
285. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 102, at 276.
286. See Levinson, supra note 17, at 665-70.
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II, operating to stack the deck in favor of subconstitutional policies and the
constituencies that support them.
Indeed, from a functional perspective, it becomes difficult to see any clear
distinction between political entrenchment at the constitutional and
subconstitutional levels. As theorists of the small-c constitution recognize, and
as we have emphasized here, many subconstitutional rules and arrangements
are at least as entrenched as many constitutional norms (in addition to sharing
other indicia of constitutionality, like heightened democratic support or
structural significance). And many formally constitutional rules and rights
seem not to be especially entrenched against functional change. Rather than
viewing constitutional entrenchment as a separate and superior category,
public law scholars might do better to recognize the continuity of political
entrenchment at the constitutional and subconstitutional levels.
2. The Uncertain Categorical Boundaries ofEntrenchment
Up to now, we have attempted to show that the kinds of political
arrangements and consequences that are described as "entrenchment" in the
formal electoral, legislative, and constitutional contexts have functional
analogues that share all of the relevant features and that cannot be
meaningfully distinguished. In advancing these arguments, we have taken for
granted that political entrenchment can be usefully understood as a distinctive
and reasonably well-defined phenomenon. But once we move beyond formal
definitions of entrenchment, the boundaries of the category, and hence its
analytical value, begin to blur.
As we have seen, entrenchment ends to be identified with barriers put in
place by upstream decision makers that impede political changes preferred by
present majorities or that make the status quo more difficult to change than it
was to create in the first place. Upon reflection, however, there are
innumerable political arrangements that fit these descriptions.
As a first cut, to the extent entrenchment is identified with impediments to
present majority will, it becomes difficult to distinguish from the many other
countermajoritarian features of the U.S. political system. Some of these
features are a product of constitutional design.8' In addition to the formal
supermajorities required to ratify a treaty or convict an impeachment,
bicameralism and separation of powers, combined with the different electoral
287. On the countermajoritarian and more generally counterdemocratic features imposed by the
U.S. Constitution, see ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? (2001); and SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2006).
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bases of the Senate, the House, and the President, impose a de facto
supermajority requirement for enacting legislation. The constitutional
malapportionment of the Senate and the Electoral College, combined with
internal legislative rules and arrangements, like the Senate filibuster and the
congressional committee system, create further minority veto gates that are
often used to block majority-preferred actions. And of course, constitutional
rights and judicial review at least sometimes impose countermajoritarian
constraints. Beyond the constitutional structure of government, numerous
other institutional arrangements and familiar features of democratic politics
conspire against perfect responsiveness to majoritarian preferences: the
disproportionate influence of well-organized, well-connected, or wealthy
minorities and interest groups; the vagaries of cycling and agenda setting;
information deficiencies; political geography; and so on.
In short, frustration of majority will-and even supermajority will-is a
pervasive feature of American politics.88 Against this background, demarcating
a discrete category of entrenchment defined in terms of political constraints on
present majority will presents a conceptual challenge. It is not obvious on what
basis the paradigm cases of formal electoral and legislative entrenchment or the
functional analogues we presented in Part II should be distinguished from the
broader universe of countermajoritarian features of the American democratic'
system.99
Another intuitive understanding of entrenchment emphasizes the
asymmetrical difficulty of reversing prior political decisions and, as a
consequence, the disproportionate influence of past decision makers over
present and future ones. Thus, political entrenchment is thought to arise when
"a temporary political majority (in the society and in the legislature) . . .
extend[s] its hold on power into the future,"290 or when a political action
"limits the policy choices available to future governments."9 '
Here again, however, it is hard to see the boundaries of any category
defined in this way. Nearly every political action -as well as every instance of
inaction -has some constraining effect on the choices of downstream decision
288. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
289. One limiting feature of entrenchment, as compared to the broader category of
countermajoritarianism, is that entrenchment is focused on impediments to political change.
Yet countermajoritarian political decision making can also be a source of political change.
Minorities can block political changes preferred by majorities, but they can also enact
political changes dispreferred by majorities.
29o. Klarman, supra note 4, at 498.
291. Serkin, supra note 3, at 888.
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makers." At a minimum, every political decision will generate different "facts
on the ground" that subsequent political actors will have to reckon with.
Political actors at Time One who decide (not) to start a war, slow global
warming, foster economic growth, borrow money, or invest in education will
bequeath different states of the world to their successors-and therefore
different political options, with different costs, benefits, and distributive
consequences. Decisions at Time Two will invariably depend on the
environment and political calculus created by decisions at Time One.
One way of limiting the category of entrenchment is to focus on the
purpose or motivation of present decision makers. As we have seen, concerns
about formal, legal entrenchment have focused on intentional efforts by parties
and politicians who are self-consciously seeking to secure their hold on power
or the durability of their policies at the expense of rivals.293 (As we have also
seen, functional entrenchment strategies can be deployed intentionally and
strategically in just the same way.) But if the salient feature of entrenchment is
control of the future by the past, it is not obvious why the purposes or
motivations of political decision makers should matter at all. From the
perspective of the present, the constraints imposed by past decisions will be the
same regardless of whether they were intended or entirely inadvertent.
As it happens, the phenomenon of entrenchment as it has been understood
by social scientists and historians (and even the occasional legal scholar) is in
no way limited to the self-consciously strategic efforts of political actors. To the
contrary, in many contexts the focus is on "entrenched" rules, policies, and
institutions that have become socially and politically difficult to change owing
to path-dependent processes of political development that were never intended
or foreseen by their creators.294 In fact, social scientists view this kind of
unintentional entrenchment, or "lock in," as a quite general phenomenon,
resulting from a somewhat predictable set of political dynamics -including, in
particular, the political feedback effects of empowering winners while
disempowering losers that we highlighted in Part II."s
a2. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 67, at 530-31 (recognizing that "in some sense all acts of
present legislature [s] -for example, decisions about whether to declare war, how much
money to print, whether to invest in infrastructure, and whether to invest in education-
limit what future legislatures might do"); Klarmai, supra note 4, at 504-05 ("[V]irtually any
action taken by today's majority may (deleteriously) affect the future."); Serkin, supra note
3, at 888 ("In principle, this definition is sufficiently broad to encompass every single act
that a government undertakes.").
293. See supra Section I.B.
294. See Starr, supra note lo.
295. See id. at 23-26.
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Examples can be found in nearly every area of policy and politics. In
contrast to President Roosevelt's strategic posture toward entrenching Social
Security, there is no reason to believe that the designers of Medicare were
plotting entrenchment, yet the program appears just as deeply entrenched as a
result of more or less the same set of political dynamics. 9 Or consider the
home mortgage interest deduction, which created- apparently quite by
accident -a constituency of homeowners and mortgage lenders that is deeply
committed to, and formidably capable of, preserving their entitlement.97
Along the same lines, the casual, short-sighted decision of Congress to exempt
existing coal-fired plants from the stringent regulations of the 1970 Clean Air
Act gave rise to a powerful interest group that served as a major impediment to
subsequent antipollution and climate change measures.298 Legal scholars have
documented how rules of corporate law relating to ownership structure have
become entrenched through a political-economic feedback cycle in which
existing rules and arrangements increase the wealth and political power of
corporate stakeholders who have an interest in maintaining or enhancing these
rules and arrangements.299 Regulatory regimes governing corporate ownership
structure and telecommunications have become increasingly difficult to modify
as influential stakeholder groups become more deeply invested in, and better
able to defend, existing arrangements.3 oo
Relatively localized examples like these could be multiplied countlessly, but
inadvertent, functional entrenchment also operates on a broader scale. For
instance, the political economy of modern capitalism probably involves a
similar "rich get richer" dynamic, in which economic winners wield their newly
acquired wealth and power to preserve and augment institutions that allow
them to become ever more wealthy and politically influential.30 ' Even more
broadly, Acemoglu and Robinson's account of why some nations become
wealthy while others fail describes a similarly self-reinforcing historical
296. See id. at 31-35.
297. See Hal R. Varian, An Opportunity To Consider if Homeowners Get Too Many Breaks, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo5/1n/17/business/17scene.html [http://
perma.cc/9WXV-JFGC].
298. See Richard L. Revesz, "War on Coal" or "Original Sin"? Power Plants, Public Health, and
Climate Change (Sept. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
299. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory ofPath Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 157-60 (1999).
300. See id. (discussing corporate ownership structure); Starr, supra note to, at 27-29 (discussing
"policy-technological lock" in the context of communications policy).
301. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
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process, through which an initial set of political arrangements produces
economic consequences that in turn reinforce the initial political arrangements,
resulting in deeply entrenched political-economic regimes that persist for
centuries -well beyond the time horizons or design capabilities of any group of
political actors.3o2 Along the same lines, any kind of path-dependent account of
historical processes will portray initial choices or contingencies as shaping
future decisions and outcomes in a manner that could be assimilated to
entrenchment. For example, the vast bodies of work exploring the "historical
legacies" of colonialism, communism, or slavery, documenting broad patterns
of economic, political, and social development hat stem from prior conditions,
could be understood as addressing entrenchment writ large.303
Recognizing the general path-dependence of human history is obviously a
long leap from the specific phenomena of legislative and electoral
entrenchment and their close functional analogues. But that is the point. If the
salient feature of entrenchment is that past political decisions continue to hold
sway over the present, then entrenchment is a vastly broader category than is
commonly perceived. To the extent history matters - which is to say, to a
virtually unlimited extent-present political decisions will be shaped and
constrained by prior choices. Ongoing rule by the dead hand of the past is a
ubiquitous and unavoidable feature of temporally extended democracy.
This is not to prejudge any effort toward usefully differentiating a more
circumscribed category of political entrenchment. It is merely to point out the
absence of conceptual resources for doing so in the existing literature on
entrenchment. Once we blur the distinction between formal and functional
entrenchment, the question of how else the category of political entrenchment
might be usefully bounded becomes open.
CONCLUSION
Courts and legal scholars have focused considerable attention on the
problem of political entrenchment. Yet their focus has been oddly myopic,
302. See supra note ii and accompanying text. Other accounts of the development of the system
of modern capitalism-both of its origins starting in sixteenth-century Europe and of its
culmination in contemporary America- describe a similar process of self-reinforcing
entrenchment, in which the rich get richer and more powerful and use their snowballing
advantages to entrench capitalist arrangements. See Daron Acemoglu et al., The Rise of
Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546
(2005).
303. See Starr, supra note lo, at 36-45.
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narrowly directed toward the formal "rules of the game"3o4 governing elections,
legislation, and constitutional amendment, each considered as its own
independent domain. By failing to appreciate both the common denominators
among the various impediments to political change in these areas and the vast
terrain of functional analogues, public law has avoided confronting
entrenchment as a general feature of the democratic process. This narrow focus
has limited the extent to which courts and scholars have developed a coherent
understanding of what political entrenchment is, why or when it is bad, and
what-if anything-legal regulators should do about it.
This Article has sought to broaden the frame that public law places around
entrenchment. Its core contribution has been to call attention to the ways in
which politicians, parties, and policies can be entrenched against change not
just by changing the formal rules of the political game but by playing the game
in strategic ways: enacting substantive policies that strengthen political
allies or weaken political opponents, shifting the composition of the political
community, or altering the structure of government decision making. These
kinds of functional entrenchment strategies allow political actors to achieve the
same results without resorting to the kinds of formal rule changes that would
raise red flags from the perspective of public law. Recognizing the continuity of
formal and functional entrenchment thus invites the question of why public
law identifies and condemns the former while ignoring or pardoning the latter.
It also raises a broader set of questions about the phenomenon of political
entrenchment. To start, the familiar set of commitment and stability benefits
stemming from entrenchment in many different contexts, ranging from
sovereign debt to environmental stewardship, complicates the common (if not
consistent) public law intuition that impediments to political change should be
suspect. Political entrenchment, whether formal or functional, has potential
benefits as well as costs that must be assessed contextually and empirically.
Public law's longstanding embrace of entrenchment by way of
constitutionalism is a rather significant illustration of this point. What is it that
differentiates constitutional entrenchment, or the entrenchment of monetary
policy through independent central banks, from the kinds of electoral and
legislative entrenchment that public law regards as obviously problematic?
Under what conditions should we view the entrenchment of politicians,
parties, or policies as beneficial, benign, or pathological? And then, at a
conceptual level, once we move beyond the myopic focus on formal
entrenchment and expand our frame of vision to encompass close functional
substitutes, the boundaries of the category of political entrenchment become
304. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 709.
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difficult to discern. How should we understand and differentiate entrenchment
from the inevitable influence of the past on the future and the ubiquitous path-
dependence of political decision making? Definitive answers to these questions
await further inquiry, but an important first step is to frame the questions
clearly and explain why they are important, as we have attempted to do here.
The analysis of entrenchment presented in this Article feeds into several
more general currents in public law and democratic theory. There is a vast
literature in political science and law on the various mechanisms of democratic
design that impede or facilitate political change. These include studies of
supermajority and other kinds of voting rules that impose varying degrees of
difficulty on departures from the status quo; "temporary" legislation and other
timing rules that formally require or expire political actions;os institutional
arrangements that create or mitigate gridlock in political decision-making
processes;3o6 the propelling and paralyzing effects of presidential versus
parliamentary systems, or party-unified versus divided government;30 7 the role
of the judiciary in accelerating or braking legal and political transformations;"o0
critical theories advocating greater "plasticity" in democratic and social
structures;30 9  and, of course, constitutionalism.31 o Viewing political
entrenchment alongside these and other theoretical perspectives on the pace
and pathways of political change might be mutually illuminating.
Our analysis of entrenchment also links to other areas of public law in
which functional perspectives have complicated conventional understandings
of formal rules and arrangements. Some of these connections we have noted:
the reality of constitutional change through channels other than the Article V
amendment process,"' the dependence of constitutional entrenchment and
constraint upon underlying political commitments to maintain and respect
305. See FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT
LEGISLATION (2013); Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007);
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARv. L. REV. 543
(2007).
306. See, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998).
307. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARv. L.
REV. 2312 (2006).
308. Compare Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 8o VA. L.
REV. 7 (1994), with Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 8o VA.
L. REV. 173 (1994).
309. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL
STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS (1987).
310. See, e.g., MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 156-59 (2007) (arguing
that constitutional entrenchment is at odds with fundamental democratic values).
311. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rules and rights,' and the existence of "superstatutes" and other
formally subconstitutional policy instruments that share some (if not all) of the
functional attributes of constitutionality."' Other recent works in public law
describe how party politics have functionally transformed the formal system
of separation of powers314 and federalism,"'s how the formally counter-
majoritarian capacity of judicial review has been tempered by the functional
realities of politics,31' how states and localities exercise meaningful forms of
power despite the erosion of their formal sovereignty,17 and how the political
reality of presidential leadership and executive dominance has come to trump
the legal formalities of a more limited executive role."' Many more examples
could be added to this list, but the general point should be clear: political
entrenchment is far from the only area in which the formal legal rules
do not fully capture-and may in fact obscure-fuller and more realistic
understandings of how political processes and institutions function for
purposes of public law.
Finally, our account of political actors' ability to use functional
entrenchment devices to navigate around prohibitions on formal entrenchment
seems of a piece with a broader body of scholarship cataloguing the ways
motivated parties avoid the dictates of public law by resorting to legally
permissible means of accomplishing ends that public law intends to prohibit.
Such public law "workarounds" take many forms, potential and actual.319 For
example, although the Constitution contemplates a President elected according
to the votes of the Electoral College, states could ensure that the President was
elected by a national popular majority by directing their electors to vote for the
312. See supra notes 93, 278-281 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
314. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 307.
315. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
316. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 282.
317. See Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (20o6); Benjamin I.
Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(2011).
318. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
319. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1499 (20o9). Tushnet says
that "constitutional workarounds" are possible "(a) when there is significant political
pressure to accomplish some goal, but (b) some parts of the Constitution's text seem fairly
clear in prohibiting people from reaching that goal directly, yet (c) there appear to be other
ways of reaching the goal that fit comfortably within the Constitution." Id. at 1503.
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person who wins the national popular vote. 0 Even the Constitution's core
rights-granting provisions are subject to workarounds. For example, although
abortion cannot be banned directly, the procedure can be put out of reach
through the imposition of multiple confining regulations known as TRAPs
(targeted regulation of abortion providers).' More generally, notwithstanding
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, governments are often permitted to
accomplish indirectly what they are forbidden from doing directly by using the
incentive of conditional funding.' In the statutory context, campaign finance
law's susceptibility to workarounds is well known and well captured by the
metaphor of "hydraulics."' When the law closes one channel for political
spending, political actors simply open up substitute channels. Similarly, state
and local actors can often find ways to avoid the preemptive effect of federal
statutes.? For example, although federal law preempts essentially all state and
local regulation of union organizing, states and cities have averted this bar
through creative partnerships with unions and employers." Similar
possibilities for working around environmental, ERISA, and immigration
preemption are also available. * Thus, functional entrenchment is another
reminder that political actors can often navigate around public law rules, and
that public law often serves to channel means rather than dictate ends.
320. See id. at 1500. For another example, the infamous "Saxbe fix" has been used to work around
the Emoluments Clause, allowing, for instance, Hillary Clinton to be appointed Secretary of
State despite the fact that the salary for that position had been increased while Clinton was
serving in the Senate. See id. at 1501.
321. Cf Virginia: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), NARAL PRo-
CHOICE Am., http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/state-governments
/state-profiles/virginia.html [http://perma.cc/T6VR-XLNH] (describing various statutory
regulations that effectively limit access to abortion).
322. For example, constitutional constraints mean that the government cannot directly prohibit
private organizations from offering abortion counseling services, but the federal government
was able to move in this direction by conditioning the grant of funding for family planning
services on recipients' agreement not to offer abortion counseling. See Rust v. Sullivan, Soo
U.S. 173 (1991). Similarly, constitutional limitations made it at least uncertain whether the
federal government could mandate that states set their drinking age at twenty-one, but
Congress was able to work around any such constitutional restriction by withholding
federal highway money from states that allowed people under twenty-one to drink. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
323. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999).
324. See Sachs, supra note 317, at 1157-60.
325. See id. at 1154-56.
326. See id. at 1222.
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We leave these further pathways of investigation for another day. For now,
our more limited ambition has been to show that the conceptual boundaries
and normative implications of political entrenchment overflow the formal and
narrowly categorical terms in which the phenomenon has been cast in public
law. At the very least, courts and scholars, along with voters and citizens,
would do well to recognize that it is not only the arcane possibility of legislative
entrenchment or the transparently strategic features of election law like
gerrymandering and voter ID requirements that should be viewed through the
prism of entrenchment. Labor law reform ought to be understood as a partisan
battle between incumbent Democrats and Republicans fighting over their own
election prospects, and not only as a contest over union organizing rights and
labor-management relations. The same is true for immigration law, tort law,
and many other policy initiatives. It is also true for the creation of central
banks, human rights treaties, and the question of whether or not the District of
Columbia should become a state. And it is true about environmental policy and
the Affordable Care Act. Recognizing that these and many other policies and
political arrangements have important implications for the prospects and
pathways of change opens a new perspective on entrenchment as a pervasive
feature of democratic politics.
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